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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Muranov Discusses Armed Forces Crime, Criticizes Law on Servicemen

93UM0812A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
27 Aug 93 p 2

[Interview with Colonel General Anatoliy Muranov, deputy minister of justice of Russia and chief of the directorate of military courts of the Ministry of Justice, by Ivan Sergeyev, ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent; place and date not given: "Is the Military Court Impartial?"]

[Text]

[Sergeyev] Anatoliy Ivanovich, you recently visited the Western Group of Forces and inspected the work of the military courts. How does the ZGV [Western Group of Forces] look against the background of the internal districts of Russia?

[Muranov] Until very recently the group of forces distinguished itself in a better direction. Now also, according to our indicators (the level of previous convictions, observance of legality, and law and order), the situation here is much more successful than in the internal military districts. Nevertheless, negatives have also started to appear in the Western Group of Forces associated with the theft and squandering of POL and equipment.

[Sergeyev] But what can you say about the accusations of corruption against the Western Group of Forces?

[Muranov] We do not have the kind of materials that would have to be filed with a military court in such an event. Moreover, I do not have a right to express any point of view to a court. Unfortunately, some of our politicians do not adhere to such a policy.

[Sergeyev] The crime situation, according to estimates of the law enforcement workers themselves, started to threaten the security of the country a long time ago. I do not think that these troubles bypassed the army...

[Muranov] The processes occurring in the country influence the state of legality and law and order in the Armed Forces. If everything is laid out in order of importance, I would say that I am troubled most of all by the evasion of military service and theft of military property.

The paradox, in my opinion, is that on the one hand the number of evasions of military service has increased, and on the other, there has been a reduction in the number of those against whom criminal proceedings have been brought. In 1992 throughout the Armed Forces, if I am not mistaken, only five persons

were convicted for being absent without leave. However, this does not mean that only five persons in the Armed Forces evaded service.

There are several reasons for this: Tender-hearted mothers are simply stealing their sons who are "homesick." This home, for example, is in the independent states—Ukraine, or the Caucasus, where Russian laws do not apply. While resolutions are found for problems like this in the states of Central Asia, this is not the case in the other states.

Frequent violations of order in a service organization of the Armed Forces and a drop in its prestige prompt servicemen to desert military units...

Analysis of crime in the Army and Navy enables the conclusion that more and more officers and warrant officers are committing mercenary crimes.

[Sergeyev] In your opinion, is there a connection between avoidance of service and draft evasion?

[Muranov] I will note that draft evasion is outside the jurisdiction of the military courts. But there is a connection: In total, these crimes have a negative effect on the combat capability of the country. Last year approximately 30,000 youths evaded one of the draft calls, but about 300 were convicted. No, I am not for the adoption of punitive measures without exception, but each draftee should feel and know his responsibility for violating the law.

[Sergeyev] It seems, Anatoliy Ivanovich, that the law is bad?

[Muranov] The law itself is fine, but the mechanism for its implementation does not work. Neither the militia, the civilian procuracy, nor the courts are working on this. For them, draft evasion is a trifle. Believe me, this is not a trifle with respect to the security of the country. Unfortunately, only the people in uniform understand this.

[Sergeyev] In many ways the prestige of military service was affected by the inconsistent actions of parliament, which adopted the Law "On the Status of Servicemen" and afterwards "excluded" some of the articles from it...

[Muranov] It seems to me that this should not have happened. The laws passed by the Supreme Soviet are obliged to go through preliminary study in interested departments and be coordinated in the Ministry of Justice. But a law passed this way sometimes does not have an economic base. That same law "On the Status of Servicemen," when examined thoroughly, gives no guarantees today or tomorrow with regard to a number of positions. But a law that does not have fundamentals, a basis, works against itself and against the state.

I make this judgment because numerous complaints come to the military courts from servicemen: A law comes out, but where are the authorized privileges and rights? What should the court do in this situation? Arrive at a decision on the basis of the law? But in this case who will implement it and how? The question arises as to why adopt a law that promises a lot, when there is no mechanism for its implementation? The question is, why mislead people?

[Sergeyev] Questions, Anatoliy Ivanovich, questions... As I understood it, you are a supporter of the participation of experts and specialists of concerned ministries and departments in the development of draft laws?

[Muranov] Unquestionably. Such an approach, in my opinion, would promote successful work on a law that would not fail in practice.

Penza Oblast Commissar Discusses Current Draft, Draft Dodging

93UM0812B Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
31 Aug 93 p 2

[Interview with Major General Viktor Belousov, military commissar of Penza Oblast, by Captain Vladimir Mokhov, freelance correspondent; place and date not given: "From Penza to the Presidential Regiment"]

[Text] From year to year Penza Oblast sends an appropriately prepared draftee contingent to the Armed Forces. These lads, as a rule, are entrusted with the execution of responsible tasks, and quite a few positive comments come from the units.

Our freelance correspondent met with Major General Viktor Belousov, military commissar of Penza Oblast, and asked him to comment on a number of questions.

Draft Call-93: Problems, Opinions

[Mokhov] Viktor Vasilyevich, the regular spring draft campaign is behind us. What were its peculiarities?

[Belousov] As before, we completely filled the General Staff order. Our countrymen traditionally manned the teams from which soldiers were assembled for the security of the Kremlin, for the honor guard company, for the Airborne Troops, and so forth. Numerous letters and telegrams addressed to the chairman of the oblast soviet and the head of the oblast administration eloquently attest to how they are serving—they contain only good words.

Regarding the peculiarities of the present draft call, I can cite the fact that we sent approximately twice as many boys to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] than we did previously. The manning of the presidential regiment was also a novelty for us.

[Mokhov] You did not say that the military commissariats subordinate to you were engaged in the organization of selection of youths also for contracted service.

[Belousov] True. And, incidentally, a commission of the General Staff called us among the best in Russia for this work. They began the work with speeches of our officers on local television and in the newspapers. After a strong propaganda onslaught, they shifted to specific work through the military commissariats. This produced results rather quickly.

The contract detail consists of 628 persons, although it might change. We are selecting people not only for units of the Volga District but also for Tajikistan, the Transcaucasus, and Pridnestrovyie. There are no problems with recruitment. The problem is elsewhere. We select people and fill out the documents, but at times we wait an endlessly long time for their dispatch.

[Mokhov] Let us return to questions of the draft call. However successful the statistics on this question are, there are those in Penza Oblast who evade service in the Army. What is the reason here?

[Belousov] The peak in evading military service in the country came in 1991-1992. Against the background of the other oblasts, we looked preferable. Although, of course, this contagion did not bypass us either: The oblast ended up with about 800 "draft dodgers."

[Mokhov] Complaints were heard more than once from workers of military commissariats that, they said, the law was not working and the territorial procuracies were in no hurry to institute proceedings against those who evaded service...

[Belousov] We arranged cooperation with the civilian procuracy. Before the draft call, as a rule, we hold a conference or a working discussion and consider joint action procedures. And here the law enforcement organs, if you wish, receive directions for tough monitoring of these questions. The law, of course, should work, but we also are not supporters of some kind of show trials. Therefore, criminal proceedings are instituted against from one to three persons from each draft call, and not more. In an absolute majority of cases all the misunderstandings are resolved in working order. But arguments of the type "I did not receive the call-up papers" are being blocked by increased control. In a word, we try to bring the matter to the army and not to a court.

[Mokhov] But in this sense, how are relations developing with the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers and other public structures?

[Belousov] The Committees of Soldiers' Mothers, incidentally, were established with our participation. Perhaps that is why parents did not raise questions that are troubling them in such an intolerable form as in other

cities—they did not lie down on the railroad tracks, they did not block traffic, and they did not interfere in the planned work of the military commissariats.

We at first showed our induction center "kitchen" to all of the parents whose sons we sent into the army. They saw where and how the draftees are fed, live, and rest. They were convinced that the lads are not left to themselves. We sensed that complete openness and frankness could become our allies, and we do not close the induction center up tight, as was done previously. We showed its work on local television. In this way we removed thousands of questions, and with them the tension that sometimes reaches a great height with parents.

For example, there are cases when one or another team is manned at a tough time: Only two days were given for everything. Although I will say honestly: I see no particular reason for the lads being assembled in a rush for units that are deployed on the territory of the district. But this is our purely army defect.

[Mokhov] Military commissariats, figuratively speaking, are the political missions of the army in the localities. But today the public attitude of a number of Volga area republics toward the oblasts tends to be that the military commissariats should be entirely under the local organs of authority.

[Belousov] I think that as the interests of manpower acquisition for the Armed Forces are in the hands of the Ministry of Defense, this means that the military commissariats should also be under this department. Through the commanding officers of the troops of the districts, headquarters, and the organization and mobilization directorates. The details can be changed somewhat, and perfected, but the system that has been developed must not be broken... We have already broken up enough even so...

Last year, for example, when crime increased, I was hit from all sides: Man the troops of the MVD. I say, I cannot, I do not have the order. On the other hand, the General Staff requires people for combat units, where there also is a shortage. What is to be done under such conditions? Now, it is true, the problem has been removed, the internal troops have begun to recruit under contract.

[Mokhov] It is generally known that in recent years it is becoming more and more difficult to resolve questions of financial and material support for the draft. Is it not easier for you?

[Belousov] We have reached a complete mutual understanding with the oblast and city administrations and with the oblast and rayon soviets. A fund is being set up in the oblast budget for financial support of the

draft. For example, for the payment of transport which has become so unbelievably expensive today.

As for food, 800 rubles [R] is being spent per inductee per day. And while in the city a meal costs R180 and higher, it costs us R105-110.

[Mokhov] The impression is created that you have generally gotten rid of a majority of the problems.

[Belousov] There are of course, problems. Our base requires substantial improvement. Five military commissariats do not have rayon induction centers.

There are problems with medical examinations in remote areas. In order to man medical committees there that work with draftees (we do not have enough of our own doctors), it is usually necessary to send five-10 specialists from the oblast center. This year you send some, next year—others. It is clear why much is done with them in a formal way. Thus it becomes necessary to send all the draftees through the control commission at the induction center.

I also cannot help complaining about the level of military and moral training of the draftees. Military instructors have gone out of the schools. The old system has been wrecked, but there is no new one. There is not even the mechanism itself for influencing the teenagers. We exist by ourselves, and they exist by themselves. Our paths cross only at the induction committee. And this is one of the most difficult questions to resolve, apparently, even in the long term.

The resolution of a big part of the problems, I think, is in the jurisdiction of the government and the Supreme Soviet. Therefore, it is important to examine them through the prism of long-term state interests; otherwise, the autumn draft call will proceed with much greater difficulty.

Serviceman Arrested for Theft of Surface-to-Air Missiles

934F1081B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
3 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Valeriy Golovin, ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent: "In His Personal Baggage—Combat Missiles..."]

[Text] As strange as it may seem, it was thieves who helped the associates of the militia department at the Khabarovsk-2 station to make a dangerous discovery. Had they not opened a railroad container en route, the "pinkertons" would not have found among the household items... four nuclear missiles of the "surface to air" class, and several explosive charges.

The owner of the cargo, who was travelling to one of the western oblasts of the country, turned out to be Ensign K. from a subdivision of the marine aviation, stationed in Primorskiy Kray. The investigation has yet to determine for what purpose the retired ensign was taking the army missiles and explosives to his new place of residence.

Although the Far East certainly does not aspire to leadership in Russia in regard to poor security of weapons and munitions, nevertheless they are stolen here quite often. After all, the goods are in demand today, and they steal them not only from the army. As our ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent was told at the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] press center in Khabarovsk Kray, literally a few days ago the sports shooting club "Zvezda", which is located in the northern village of Chegetmyn, discovered that two SKS carbines and 20 pistols were missing. Large numbers of firearms also turned up missing at the Khabarovsk militia school. It turns out, now is it time for missiles?

CIS: POLICY

Lt-Gen Voronin Calls for Single Body of Armed Forces Regulations

93UM0818A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Sep 93 p 2

[Interview with Lt-Gen (res) Aleksandr Voronin by Igor Pozdnyakov under "Current Theme" rubric: "If the Regulations Are Law, Then the Parliament Must Pass Them"]

[Text]

The decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation "On the Procedures for Putting into Effect the Law 'On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service'" to the Government of the Russian Federation proposed that drafts of General Military Regulations be presented to the Supreme Soviet by 1 April 1993. Parliament has not yet received these documents, however. Therefore the parliamentary Committee on Questions of Defense and Security, in turn, took the initiative and began to develop a concept that can be the basis for the General Military Regulations of the Russian Federation. Lt-Gen (res) Aleksandr Voronin, People's Deputy of Russia, tells how the work is going on this document.

[Pozdnyakov] Aleksandr Ivanovich, it would be interesting to know about the approaches that the Committee on Questions of Defense and Security is taking in developing a concept for General Military Regulations.

[Voronin] We on the committee have come to the unanimous opinion: we need unified General Service Regulations of the Russian Federation, whose positions

would be basic not only for the armed forces but also for all military formations of ministries and state committees and departments in which the law provides for military service.

We assumed that any military regulation is a specific document requiring special precision in its formulations and definitions and ensuring a clear regulation of the service activities of the serviceman, subunit, or unit. Practice shows that such normative acts as the General Military Regulations are adopted in the state rather infrequently and affect the lives and work of millions of people. For this reason, the General Military Regulations must be put into effect only after going through all of the procedures set forth by the rules of the Supreme Soviet for the adoption of a federal law. The procedure for the passage of the regulations through the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet, their review in the government, ministries, and state committees and departments where the law provides for military service, and the performance of a legal appraisal of the regulations will make it possible to avoid a one-sided approach to the content of the document. It will make it possible to consider the interests of the society and state as well as the interests of servicemen and military collectives. It is with this in mind that the committee presents its concept.

[Pozdnyakov] What, in the opinion of the committee, must be the content of the General Military Regulations and how will they differ from the existing provisional regulations?

[Voronin] As I already said, we are for unified General Military Regulations of the Russian Federation. The working group of the committee feels that their basic purpose is to reveal the nature of military service, to define the concepts of military discipline, one-man command, and orders, and to regulate interrelations between servicemen and their general rights, duties, and responsibilities. The regulations must clearly and unequivocally define the disciplinary rights of commanders and chiefs and the cases and procedures for the use of weapons. The regulations must also regulate the official duties of servicemen and the general procedures and rules for the performance of alert duty and other special obligations. The existing provisional regulations are overloaded with sections and articles whose positions do not require legislative support. Our committee is of the opinion that the right to regulate matters of internal order and internal service, to organize service in the garrison, to define the obligations of specific officials, and also to perform military rituals must be granted to the Council of Ministers, the minister of defense, the commanders in chief of the branches of the armed forces, the commanders of functional and territorial commands, and managers of ministries, committees, and departments that include military formations. Such an approach will

make it possible to achieve a greater degree of specification and critical analysis of some position or other and to consider the specific nature of military service in the branches and components of service. This will make it possible to correct departmental normative documents expeditiously if their content ceases to meet contemporary requirements. The General Military Regulations will become less voluminous, more understandable, and easier to learn.

It must also be said that in the opinion of the committee some of the formulations and definitions in the provisional regulations do not consider the entire spectrum of changes that have been introduced in our legislation, the cases and procedure for the use of weapons have not been formulated precisely enough, the specific nature of contract military service was not reflected, and there is much repetition and many declarative positions.

These problems require close attention and careful study.

[Pozdnyakov] Could you now name the main problems that arose in the course of the work on the concept of the General Military Regulations?

[Voronin] Of course there are problems. Whereas we have already worked out a common approach with respect to the structure of the regulations, there is not yet mutual understanding in the working group on a number of specific questions. One of the problems is how to define the role and place of the commander's order as the basic form of control and putting decisions into effect. How can one ensure the high authority of orders in daily life? Must any injunction of the commander be defined as an order? For it is necessary to remember that the everyday practice of commanding the forces requires of the commander a significant number of instructions, directives, and setting of the tasks for subordinates, which do not always directly affect matters of combat readiness.

Or still another problem. Article 89 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that "confinement under guard and deprivation of liberty are permissible exclusively on the basis of a decision by a court in the manner prescribed by law." In such a case, what must be the procedure for the commander to apply disciplinary measures in the form of arrest and the execution of punishment?

The units now have more and more soldiers and sergeants performing military service under contract. I repeat that the General Military Regulations of the Russian Federation must consider all peculiarities of the service of this category of servicemen. This involves the regulation of their service time, stationing, recreation, and several other matters.

Also of concern is the problem that Article 8 of the Law of the Russian Federation 'On the Status of Servicemen' gives them the right to participate in religious worship services in their free time. How can this right be realized in the conditions of a military unit, especially if it is several hundred kilometers from a population center?

[Pozdnyakov] And what problems, in your view, have already been solved?

[Voronin] It seems to me that we were able through regulatory positions to find a way to protect conscientious and honest commanders seeking firm military discipline and the appropriate order. On the other hand, we protected subordinates against whom improper actions have been taken. The members of the working group are unanimous here. In addition, we propose a substantial reworking of the positions of the provisional disciplinary regulations, significantly expanding both the rights and the responsibilities of commanders and chiefs in the encouragement and punishment of subordinates.

[Pozdnyakov] With whom is the working group of the committee that is developing the concept of the General Military Regulations cooperating?

[Voronin] We are working in continuous contact with representatives of the Ground Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces, the navy, the border and internal troops, the military academies imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy and imeni M.V. Frunze, and the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. Moreover the committee will examine any proposals, comments, and desires of soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, and officers who appeal to us.

[Pozdnyakov] When will the General Military Regulations be adopted?

[Voronin] Let us not forget that the committee does not view its study as the only one, for which there is no alternative. When the government presents to the Supreme Soviet its own draft regulations, it will be possible to make comparisons and to consider the positive aspects of the proposed versions. Such an approach will permit us to create a document that best meets the requirements of the time.

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Former ABM Commander on System's History, Prospects

93WC0111A *Almaty VECHERNIY ALMATY in Russian*
1, 2, and 3 Jun 93 p 3

[Interview with Col-Gen Yuriy Votintsev (ret), former commander of the Antiballistic-Missile [ABM] Defense Forces, by "Top Secret" observer Dmitriy

Tikhanov: "If There Is War Tomorrow... We Defended the USSR Against a Nuclear Strike. The CIS Cannot Be Saved from It"]

[1 Jun 93 p 3]

[Text]

[Tikhanov] Yuriy Vsevolodovich, I would like to talk with you about a very definite period of the recent history that is not very well known and not very well investigated because even now it is caught in a fog of propaganda. I mean the very beginning of the 1980's, approximately from 1981 through 1985, when the Soviet Union and the United States of America were preparing for nuclear war. Precisely during this period the KGB worked out a large-scale operation for a nuclear missile attack and the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Pentagon had corresponding strategic plans in the event of military actions. I know that during this time you were on the leading edge of this war of nerves, political passions, and military technologies.

[Votintsev] I would put it this way: the world was constantly balancing on the edge of war. After all, we did have clashes with the Americans, that is, head to head. First in Korea. A little later in Vietnam and then in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. There was always the possibility that local conflicts could grow into a global confrontation. You are right that the peak of tension came in 1982-1983.

But we began to prepare for a possible war long before this. In 1953, it became known that the United States was developing ballistic intercontinental missiles capable of inflicting a destructive nuclear strike against the territory of the USSR. In August of that same year, seven marshals of the Soviet Union, having discussed the existing situation with the chief of the General Staff V.D. Sokolovskiy, sent a secret note to the Central Committee of the CPSU with the request that they examine the possibility of developing and establishing an ABM defense. They gave their consent in the Central Committee. Prominent scientists led by the 35-year-old Dr. of Technical Sciences Grigoriy Kisunko took on this work. By 1956, proposals were ready for an experimental test model of ABM defense—the so-called "System A." They then began construction of the test range for ABM defense forces near Lake Balkhash.

The first tests took place here on 4 March 1961. On that day, an antiballistic missile created in the design bureau of general designer Petr Grushin destroyed the warhead of an R-12 ballistic missile launched from the Kapustin Yar Test Range with its fragmentation warhead. The Americans would not carry out similar tests until 23 years later. The successful experiment allowed

us to conclude work on the draft project of the A-35 ABM defense system to protect Moscow against a possible nuclear strike in June 1961. The A-35 ABM defense system was intended to destroy single-warhead ballistic missiles of the "Titan-2" and "Minuteman-2" type, which appeared in the United States in 1963 and 1965. But we did not arm ourselves with the A-35 system until 1977.

But the fact is that from the moment of the beginning of our developments the Americans worked intensively to build the land and sea-based ballistic missiles "Minuteman-3," "Polaris AZT," and "Poseidon S-3" with multiple reentry vehicles having 3 to 10 warheads. The A-35 was not capable of destroying such missiles. This had become quite clear by 1971. In that same year, D.F. Ustinov held several conferences especially dedicated to this problem. It must be said that Dmitriy Fedorovich "stood to the death" in defense of the ineffective A-35. But the commander in chief of the ABM defense forces Gen. of the Army P.F. Batitskiy, the chief of the main ordering directorate G.F. Baydukov, and I thought that it was necessary to cut back on further work on A-35 and to carry out a fundamental modernization of the systems that have already been built. I remember that as his final argument Baydukov then said to Ustinov: "If you do not agree with our demands, I will take bulldozers and tear down what has already been built!" Ultimately Ustinov was forced to agree and to accept the demands of the country's ABM defense forces.

At the present time, a fundamentally new and improved ABM defense system has been created by team of scientists and designers under the leadership of Academician Anatoliy Basistyy and is protecting Moscow.

It is customary to think that the primary military threat always came from the USSR. It may be that this will sound strange to you but I can say with full responsibility that at that time our country did not have a really verified and clear military doctrine, including in the event of nuclear war. All of the decisions on military matters were made, as a rule, at the meetings of the Politburo and were sporadic and subjective in nature. Another problem was that Ustinov, who had indisputable authority in the military-industrial complex, did not have the necessary experience in commanding forces when he became minister of defense of the USSR.

[Tikhanov] But despite the lack of a clear overall doctrine, the General Staff and its operational directorate worked constantly to develop plans for the possible waging of war. Is that so?

[Votintsev] This is quite another matter. Such plans exist in any army, including in the American Army.

Under their operational plans, in Europe, for example, three strategic sectors were established: northwest, central, and southwest. Strategic sectors were also established here but significantly later, somewhere around the beginning of the 1980's. The corresponding dispositions of forces deployed in the territory of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and border military districts in the European part of the USSR were made subordinate to these strategic sectors.

One should keep in mind that on 28-29 May 1987 the Political Consultative Committee adopted the military doctrine of the states participating in the Warsaw Pact with a clearly expressed defensive nature, especially beginning in 1988.

At the present time, journalists have gained access to the archives of the staffs of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In this connection, the article "The Short-Distance Forced March That Did Not Take Place" by Sergey Guk that was published 22 February 1992 in IZVESTIYA caused perplexity. An elaboration of individual operational-strategic command-staff doctrines cannot be taken as plans for the preparation and waging of war. The requirement that we not be the first to use nuclear weapons was law for our armed forces and only as retaliatory actions.

[Tikhanov] Nevertheless the corresponding operational plans existed in the strategic missile forces?

[Votintsev] As for the strategic missile forces, it is obvious that there were several variants of their application. Primarily against the United States of America and the regions for the patrolling of submarines, mostly in the western and central Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Norwegian Sea. In 1972, I and A.F. Shcheglov, first deputy commander in chief of the ABM defense forces, were able to visit one of the nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet. The commander showed us a special safe, where they kept punched cards with the programs for several versions of the flight assignments for each of the 16 nuclear missiles with which the submarine was armed. If necessary the safe was unlocked by two keys simultaneously and the punched cards were put into a computer. But the version of a missile strike and the order to launch the missiles were put into effect only by the commands in Moscow. After that the missile operated under the set program, so to speak. Apparently these programs provided for a so-called disarming strike, when the nuclear missile destroyed the launchers and missile bases of the enemy, and also a strike against population centers....

[2 Jun 93 p 3]

[Text]

[Tikhanov] Are there lists of such population centers?

[Votintsev] Of course. I will tell you a story in this connection.

At the beginning of the 1970's, they proposed that we calculate the possible strikes against the territory of the Soviet Union by American missiles. In the course of two months, utilizing the parameters, characteristics, and deployment sites of American nuclear weapons, military people and scientists under the leadership of A.G. Shcheglov made the corresponding calculations. At that time the United States had about 5,000 nuclear warheads and it was assumed that by 1980 the United States would have 10,000. So we figured out where each of them would land. We worked out several variants of an attack against the USSR and its allies. They were all turned over to Minister of Defense Grechko and he confirmed them. These data were used to plan the missile-space defense.

[Tikhanov] Yuriy Vsevolodovich, do you recall how many nuclear warheads were aimed at Moscow in accordance with those calculations?

[Votintsev] About 60, each with one megaton.

[Tikhanov] As far as I know, in the scope of the preparation for nuclear war, the Soviet Union carried out a series of special jobs to guarantee the security of its central command and control facilities: underground government communications, command posts, etc. Did your calculations take all of this into account?

[Votintsev] Naturally. The fact is that some modifications of nuclear weapons are intended for the destruction not only of ground but also of underground facilities. Before such missiles detonate, they penetrate the ground to a depth of 70 to 100 meters. Of course they represented an enormous danger for our underground facilities, especially for those that were built in past times. If such a missile hit one of the subway lines, people would perish simply from the gigantic dynamic hit. So in the scope of the preparation for nuclear war, as you say, several of the most important underground command and control facilities were modernized. Such structures were capable of withstanding any nuclear strike.

I would like to talk about one other thing. At that time our task was to detect the launch of a nuclear missile from any point in the United States as well as from submarines in the waters of the world oceans and also to ensure a counterstrike or retaliatory strike even before the missiles of the enemy fell on the territory of the USSR. At the beginning of the 1970's, our assumption was that 1,054 American missiles with nuclear warheads were stationed at 9 bases of the United States of America and that with optimum trajectories their approach time to the main targets in the territory of the USSR amounted to about 40 minutes. So in accordance with the standards of the time, we had about 30 minutes to deliver a retaliatory strike. Subsequently these standards were reduced considerably. And this is why. It is quite natural that the Americans wanted to

be the first to strike and thereby avoid a retaliatory strike from our side. From the start of permanent combat patrolling of the seas near the borders of the USSR by American, English, and French nuclear submarines, the approach time of submarine-launched missiles to vitally important regions of the country amounted to no more than 15-20 minutes. One of the variants: destroy our supreme command and posts for the command and control of strategic and ballistic missiles in the shortest possible time. This is when the Americans decided to station the "Pershing-2" missiles in the territory of the FRG. Their operating radius was 2,500 km. These "Persings," figuratively speaking, became a pistol aimed at the temple of Moscow. Their deployment began in 1983.

In 1982, Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov convened a conference that included the chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov, his first deputy V.I. Varennikov, the commander in chief of the ABM defense forces A.I. Koldunov, the first deputy commander in chief of the strategic missile forces Yu.A. Yashin, and myself. The principal question at this conference was how to counteract 108 "Pershing-2's." According to our calculations, the approach time of a "Pershing-2" to Moscow was 10-12 minutes. The nuclear warheads on them could destroy not only ground structures and communications but also penetrate to a depth of 70-100 meters, which naturally threatened underground command posts. I remember that at this conference it was decided to bring our submarines with nuclear missiles closer to the shores of the United States and also to deploy intermediate-range missiles in the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Along with other means of actively counteracting the "Pershing-2's," we looked at the necessity of the dependable detection of missile launches within no more than two or three minutes. During this period, only one long-range radar detection station (main designer Aleksandr Musatov) was capable of resolving this task. But its search sector was limited to the northern and central regions of the FRG. To monitor the southern part of Germany, where the Americans planned to deploy 27 "Pershing-2's," several design bureaus and research institutes developed plans for expensive tracking complexes.

The solution to the problem, as frequently happened, came not from the KGB but from the forces. A group of officers under the leadership of the deputy chief of the station for technical aspects substantiated and presented a proposal for the modification of the station transmitters and the expansion of its search zone right up to the southern border of the FRG. These tasks were resolved in a short time with minimum expenditures. Ten officers of the station were granted government awards.

We had a unified air defense plan. The systems for warning against missile attack, the monitoring of

space, and space defense as well as systems for anti-missile defense were on permanent combat alert in the status of highest combat readiness. The arms systems at each facility had double and triple redundancy. One set was in combat routine at all times, the second in the so-called "warmed-up" state of readiness for combat operations, and the third in "cold" status. It required just a fraction of a second to switch from the combat system to reserve systems. Every violation of the work regime was reported at once to the General Staff and personally to the minister of defense of the USSR.

At that time there were about 10,000 fragments of artificial objects, artificial earth satellites, space stations, and so on "flying around" in space. All of these objects, right down to the very smallest, are constantly in the field of vision of our monitoring system. They continually compare the "with the catalog of space objects and monitor the launches of new satellites and the termination of the existence of old ones. When some space object leaves orbit and goes into a trajectory close to that of a ballistic missile, the ABM defense systems may easily take it for a target. So the system for the monitoring of space warns of such false targets in a timely manner. This is very important, for in some individual cases the Americans, for example, registered as many as 14 false alarms on account of the malfunctioning of their system to warn against a nuclear missile threat. They even put their nuclear bombers in the air and flew as far as the pole—all because of a flock of birds or some chunk of iron that fell into the atmosphere from space.

In all of this space garbage, the Center for the Monitoring of Space (TsKKP) needs dependably to recognize the military satellites of the USSR and United States with operational equipment. In a number of cases, however, the Main Directorate for Space Hardware (GUKOS) did not announce the launch of space vehicles and did not warn the TsKKP. The Americans behaved in exactly the same way in the launch of increasingly many satellites.

[Votintsev] Since we have been talking about the monitoring of space, I would like to know how the Soviet Union participated in the so-called "star wars" program. Were there preparations for military actions in the atmosphere?

[Votintsev] Initially we had very serious debates about this program and then institutes of the Academy of Sciences, military research institutes, and the General Staff got involved in its solution. Essentially all of these institutions developed two sequential large-scale programs, "Fon-1" and "Fon-2." All of the research on these programs was headed by the Ministry for the Radio Industry and its Minister Petr Stepanovich

Pleshakov. A military-industrial commission headed by Leonid Vasilyevich Smirnov followed the realization of the program closely. The "Fon-1" program was started at the end of the 1970's but soon at one of the meetings several designers proposed that the work be cut back, because in their opinion the program had no prospects. I was against this but they did indeed cut the program and began to implement the "Fon-2" program in 1983.

[Tikhanov] What was the principal difference between the programs?

[Votintsev] Essentially the "Fon-1" program represented theoretical research in the "star wars" area—different kinds of beam weapons, electromagnetic rail guns, antiballistic missiles, including multiple warheads with subprojectiles, systems for salvo fire, and other systems. "Fon-2" was more practical and required major state financing. The fact is that "Fon-2" provided, among other things, for in-depth research in the area of the application of alternative systems capable of neutralizing the American SDI, as we are now accustomed to calling it, with "nonlethal weapons": an electromagnetic pulse that instantaneously disrupts the work of electronic hardware, the effects of lasers, in the development of which we are significantly ahead of the United States, and powerful microwave change of the field. In the mid-1980's, Academician Nikolay Dmitriyevich Ustinov involved himself in the work on this problem. And it was about then that we first used our laser device to detect the American "shuttle."

[Tikhanov] Excuse me, against a piloted spaceship?

[Votintsev] Absolutely. But not against it, rather with the task of detection. When the Americans began to launch their first "shuttles," every day we reported to the General Staff on the course of the flight of these reusable spacecraft as they flew over the territory of the USSR. And so one time Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov calls and asks: "Why do you not use our apparatus against these 'shuttles'?" Talk with Nikolay Dmitriyevich about this." Well, I called Niklay Ustinov.

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[Text] "No," he answers. "There is no way that I can right now. We are carrying out some operational checks. Maybe some other time." As a matter of fact, a while later the experiment took place while the laser apparatus was operating in the detection regime at the minimum radiation power. As the crew later reported, when the "shuttle" flew over the region of Balkhash, the communications and part of the equipment on the spaceship suddenly were cut off and they themselves did not feel very well. The Americans immediately

declared an official protest. After that the laser facilities and part of the radio engineering complexes of the test range were not utilized for tracking the "shuttles."

[Tikhanov] There were probably many such extraordinary events during the time when you served?

[Votintsev] They happened. I remember when the "Kosmos-954" space vehicle with a nuclear power pack on board was put into orbit. In connection with an emergency situation, the mission control center gave a signal to "Kosmos-954," after which this space vehicle was supposed to rise several hundred kilometers to a permanent orbit. But "Kosmos" slowed abruptly and it began to lose altitude quickly. You must agree that it was an extreme situation, for upon entering the dense layers of the atmosphere the nuclear power pack either blows up or it falls to earth, and then there is no avoiding radioactive contamination. So the central command post of GUKOS lost contact with "Kosmos-954." The tracking of the space vehicle and the forecasting of the regions where the nuclear unit might fall was performed by the TsKKP, which we did from 20 December 1977 through 24 January 1978. The TsKKP accurately determined the place of the fall of "Kosmos" in an uninhabited region of Canada, from which they promptly transported fragments of the nuclear power pack to the Soviet Union.

[Tikhanov] Today there is much debate about the upcoming discussion of the START II Treaty in the Russian Parliament. What do you think about this treaty?

[Votintsev] One can only welcome such a mutual reduction of nuclear weapons.

But the nuclear potential of Russia cannot be considered equal to the potential of the USSR.

With approximate quantitative parity in the traditional triad, we are substantially inferior to the United States in the quality and viability of the remaining nuclear systems:

—we are deprived of our primary advantage in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles in launch silos. The refitting of some of them for the stationing of mobile missiles is a complex and costly matter. This is confirmed by the experience in the redesigning of the silos of the UR-100 missiles for use for anti-missile missiles. The conclusion on this question can be given only by the design bureau of Academician Vladimir Pavlovich Barmin:

—the United States maintains an indisputable advantage in sea-based missiles. The United States already has 18 submarines, each of which has 24 "Trident" nuclear missiles with 8 independent reentry vehicles. We have just 6 "Typhoon" missile-armed ships, each with 20 missiles:

—the United States also has indisputable advantages in strategic bombers, including the B-1 and B-2 (invisible "stealth"). We have our decrepit TU-95 strategic bombers of various modifications. The up-to-date TU-160 strategic bombers now belong to Ukraine. The president has terminated their production for Russia.

—with the indicated reduction, the nuclear missile forces of Great Britain and France become comparable to those of Russia.

No less important:

—the treaty is silent about the demand for the strict observance of the 1972 SALT I Treaty limiting ABM systems;

—the United States did not join the position taken by Russia and France on not being the first to use nuclear weapons.

All of this requires detailed analysis by specialists. It does not preclude problems that may arise in the ratification of the treaty by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

[Tikhonov] As far as I know, the conclusion of your career coincided with the beginning of the so-called "perestroika." Now you, as a specialist and representative of the Soviet generals, can give a realistic assessment of its fruits. What do you feel now after the collapse of the Union and the unified defense system? How defenseless is Russia today?

[Votintsev] The most terrible blow was inflicted against the system for warning against a missile attack. And here is why. There is a point in the appendix to the Soviet-American AMB Treaty under which "national means of warning against a missile attack are located in border regions with antennas pointed outside." We have adhered to this treaty strictly. It is precisely for this reason that our "national means of warning" were located in Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. These are now independent states and it will be bad if we are not able to come to an agreement with them on granting the warning systems the status of Russian bases. For the politicians from the nascent states do not understand one simple thing: none of the systems for warning against missile attack is capable of operating independently, for it oversees only a limited sector of the world. The command post of this entire complex is located in Russia and all of the information from the antenna receivers converges and is processed here. Thus, it is possible from this command post alone effectively to track and warn against a sudden missile strike.

Of course it is easy for those countries about which we are talking to nationalize the facilities of the system for warning against a missile attack or, what is even worse,

to dismantle them. But that means cutting off the branch that you are sitting on, for it is primarily their own security that suffers from this. Not only Russia but also the former republics of the former USSR will be practically defenseless in the event of a nuclear strike. I take full responsibility in declaring this as a specialist and as a former commander of these forces.

I do not wish to make gloomy forecasts but if events continue to develop the way that they are developing today, if, contrary to common sense, the stations for warning against a missile attack are all nationalized, if the work on the replacement of obsolete stations with new ones is suspended, and if, God forbid, a nuclear war is suddenly unleashed, then only Moscow will be able to protect itself from the conflagration thanks to its own advanced ABM defense system. The former fraternal republics simply will not see the missiles, which will fall on their sovereign territories in an instant.

Nuclear Weapon Control System Designer Golubkov Interviewed

93UM08164 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHENEDELNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 31, 3 Sep 93 p 4

[Interview with Valentin Kharlamovich Golubkov, control designer for the Soviet nuclear retaliatory strike system, by V. Umnov, under the "Security" rubric: "Mr. President, We Are Not Joking: No One Will Repair Your Little Suitcase"]

[Text]

"How many persons in the country possess detailed knowledge of how to activate the strategic nuclear forces?"

"In industry, about 15."

—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 28 January 1992

Valentin Golubkov is one of the 15. He introduced himself as such when he telephoned the NYEG [NOVAYA YEZHENEDELNAYA GAZETA] editorial office. A department chief in the NII [Scientific Research Institute] for Automatic Apparatus, he was one of the creators of the powerful and many-branched system, the "nuclear button," which contains only a single small component.

Valentin Kharlamovich Golubkov started off by reminding us how we had ended our particular article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA: "Say a system officer comes up to Yeltsin tomorrow and says: 'That is all, Mr. President. Your little 'suitcase' is broken, and there is no one to repair it. I am going home.' That would be a shock to top all shocks!" Could it be that the time of such an occurrence is at hand?

1.5 Years Ago

One and a half years ago, before a month had passed since the USSR disintegrated, we at the editorial office - this was when we were still working for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, were visited by the chief designer of the first modification of the nuclear small suitcase. He came of his own free will, and something immediately became apparent: Something had happened. The creator of one of the country's principal secrets would not ordinarily share information about his work, all the more with journalists, since things were not done that way.

[Visitor] "Does anyone in the President's apparatus, in government, wish to become informed about our situation? To get through by traditional methods, writing letters or directly via the military, is virtually impossible today... Things are starting to fall apart, and this may weaken control over nuclear weapons... The point is, time is marching on and the system is getting old. More than that: Each technical device possesses a service life. Its useful life comes to an end, and it becomes necessary to make a decision. Replicate the same design, or, taking into account the operational experience gained, change in state system, collapse of the Union, and much more, could it be that it is necessary to come up with something new?"

Eighteen months have passed. The editorial office has received another visitor.

Even Calling For Repair Is a Problem

[Golubkov] Everyone - the remaining specialists - is leaving. Twenty thousand to 25,000 rubles a month is below the minimum living wage! Where are the former pride and joy of the institute, may I ask? Selling imported goods at the market; repairing imported machines in business offices; replacing burned-out light bulbs and cleaning lobbies in the metro.

I simply do not know what to do. In no time at all, all the developmental specialists will be gone - gone! It will even be a problem to find someone to make a repair.

[Umnov] Is there a need to make repairs?

[Golubkov] There is. We have something like one score plus ten units lying around. We have told the customer: No money from you, we do no repairs.

[Umnov] Is the customer the Ministry of Defense?

[Golubkov] Yes. It seems that money for repairs has lately been found. However, this repair work does not do the collective any good as far as the latter's well-being is concerned, since this is "contract" work. A repair is made, the cost is figured and bill paid, and the salary concept does not enter into the transaction.

State Prize Laureate Did Not Study Computers At Institute

[Umnov] Tell us something about yourself.

[Golubkov] My name is Valentin Kharlamovich Golubkov. I was born in 1940. I graduated as a teacher from the Moscow Oblast Teachers' Institute imeni Krupskaya.

[Umnov] You are not a "techie"?

[Golubkov] No. I did not work a single day as a teacher. After completing the institute I entered the Army, and, after the Army - in 1965 - I went to work for the NIIAA [Scientific Research Institute for Automatic Apparatus], where I continue to work. I rose from journeyman engineer to department chief. I was involved in programming development for automated control systems.

[From the Files Of NYeG: NIIAA is one of the head institutes involved with development of ASUs [automated control systems], including controls for nuclear weapons. At one time it employed something on the order of 10,000 to 12,000 persons; there were branches located in Riga, Yerevan, and Tbilisi. About 6,000 persons are now employed.]

[Umnov] What is your area of responsibility?

[Golubkov] Programming, which produces a system operation algorithm i.e., one that combines into a single informational unit the various technical pieces (including the nuclear suitcase).

[Umnov] Hold on there. How is it that you were able to work on such highly complex systems on the basis of a mere teacher's training?

[Golubkov] So what? Way back in 1961 we were taking a course in programming, whereby to do practical exercises we were taken to the computing center of the Academy of Sciences, which housed one of our first machines, the Strela, which took up an enormous room.

Then I started to work. There was no provision for training programmers in those years. We learned on our own, using books, of which there were only two or three. For me it was a case of sink or swim: I was put on a job to do test work. I was told to figure out everything myself and to start modernizing.

I was lucky, in that I reported for work in the fall of 1965, in 1966 we performed our first round of testing, and, in 1968, we completed our work on the system. Orders and medals were handed out, in accordance with the custom of the time.

[Umnov] You most likely are highly merited.

[Golubkov] No, I received nothing special at that time, since the traditional hurdles were in effect: It was necessary to put in at least five years of work. For the preceding system I was awarded a medal; for the last system, I was made a Laureate of the State Prize.

Can You Entrust Such Responsibility To One Man?

[Umnov] When was the first nuclear weapon automated control system produced in the Union?

[Golubkov] In the 1970s. Virtually concurrently with the deployment of ballistic missiles - even on the eve of their creation, there came about a realization: It makes no sense to heap the responsibility for pressing the button onto the shoulders of a lieutenant or captain. This could be seen in the case of the Hiroshima experience, with the pilots coming to a sad end.

Therefore, this immediately pushed forward a question: How to raise the responsibility to a higher level, such that it is not some duty captain who makes the decision on his own, but rather someone higher. And, of course, it was necessary to exclude random access to the system, the possibility of accidental missile launch.

[Umnov] What were the systems of the 1960s like?

[Golubkov] The developers of the first system took a different approach. Our institute proposed that nuclear force control be immediately set up on the basis of trucks. Most favored then were the "Ural," "Ural-14," and the "Ural-16." But they were quite puny.

However, our competitors proposed to simply limit the activities of the operator, or take away his saddle, so to speak.

This kind of system did exist; it encompassed only the single nuclear "tube." Later weapons showed up aboard aircraft, ships, submarines, tanks - aboard everything possible. Then there arose the problem of encompassing all nuclear technology.

[Umnov] What about weapons stored in depots?

[Golubkov] There, well, in those cases they have their own systems of accounting and assuring service life. I do not know who made them. They operate louvers, regulate the air supply...

[Umnov] Be that as it may let us go back two years, to the USSR's breakup.

[Golubkov] Our customers woke up in the end of the 1980s and realized that the system must be modernized. The initial idea was simple: Replicate that which already existed. Replication is no problem. There was a rule in effect from time immemorial: If a plant manufactured military equipment, it was obligated to replicate it at any given time. As far as expense was concerned, no one was concerned about that.

An estimate was made in terms of the money available at that time: The entire amount of work would require 20 million - that was in the end of 1989. The work was to take four years. A work contract was signed. A year passed. Our manufacturing plant had done nothing in that time. In accordance with the time frame set, the plant was to provide the first piece in 18 months. That was so we could perform adjustments and refinements.

While we were dickering with the plant, the Union fell apart. War broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and then there was the Spitak earthquake. Our old technological base was located in Kirovokan, the plant situation collapsed, and we were without documentation and drawings. Where else to manufacture the item? Well, there still was Zagorsk. But the lot to be produced was small and unique - who wants to fool with 10 units? We ran some figures and determined that we did not have that kind of money.

While we racked our brains and tried various negotiations, the Union suffered the final collapse. Since we could not replicate the equipment, it was proposed that we modernize the system by deriving a new set of design equations.

However, we were not prepared for the price spiral. The rate of inflation as estimated in the state budget was very low. In 1992 we had "eaten" all the advances were received. That meant that there would be no inflation allowances. So the people were left with nothing but their regular salary. Work was curtailed. We would show up at the job and do some work, but in the summer everything came to a virtual stop.

This caused panic. I sat down and tried to decide: What to do? Each week brought a minimum of two notices from leading specialists telling us they were leaving.

[Umnov] What kinds of salaries are you now being paid?

[Golubkov] A senior engineer earns 20,000, and I, as department chief, am paid 27,000.

[Umnov] How many persons are engaged in that particular line of work?

[Golubkov] In the institute we try to keep about 250 persons.

Who Should Take On This Responsibility?

[Umnov] Let us attempt to ascertain the particular threat this imposes.

[Golubkov] The developmental work pursued two goals. The first one was for us to do our utmost to extend the service life of the existing unit. The design service life was 10 years; of that, seven years were covered by warranty, while work to be done in the

remaining years was up to our own labor force and our own repair. As you can see, the service life was not unlimited.

The second goal was to expand the system's capabilities and eliminate the bugs that would show up during use. Expansion of the capabilities is a special topic, something I do not care to discuss here.

Until the process was automated, the entire responsibility fell onto the shoulders of the duty officer. Hidden somewhere in a safe was the number that would bring the "dead" missile to life. However, the higher political leadership was not privy to this operation.

The new system was to diminish the burden of responsibility levied on officers relative to making the decision to employ nuclear weapons and transfer this responsibility entirely to persons holding positions of higher political and military leadership, and it was also to offer a high degree of protection against unauthorized attempts to employ the weapons.

[Umnov] How much time is allowed to make the decision?

[Golubkov] When I was involved in that, we fought over five wretched minutes in which the retaliatory strike was to be launched. Now I have no idea whether the time is the same - five minutes - or three minutes; the country's borders have changed and I have no knowledge of the warning system.

[Umnov] But someone must make this decision.

[Golubkov] The calculations underlying this could not have been simpler: December of 1983 was the time the Pershings were deployed in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] and their time of flight was three minutes. But now - who knows? Where are submarines lying?

[Umnov] Were not you, as the developers, supposed to be in possession of this information?

[Golubkov] It was sufficient for us to be guided by a single consideration: It was necessary for the operator to gather the information within the time allowed, with the system possessing the capability of delivering this information in a minimum amount of time. That is why what we did is make equipment that makes it possible to gather the information very rapidly and deliver it reliably to the user.

[Umnov] Do you mean to say that the numerous discussions and conjectures relative to two or three small suitcases were meaningless?

[Golubkov] Not entirely meaningless. At first, the small suitcases were designed for communications, which was to be carried out any place, under all conditions.

[Umnov] Only for communications? Not for control?

[Golubkov] That is so; only for secure telephonic communications. That is why there was the task: The President should have a truly information-type small suitcase. Bearing in mind the level involved, the lack of time he has to undergo training to acquire detailed knowledge of the system. He was to simply look at the information within the required time limit, use the telephone to ascertain the veracity of the information, consult with whomever he can, then make the decision. Since the time to make the decision was a minimum, everything was automated.

At least we in training sessions were able to complete the exercise on time.

[Umnov] It is true that the systems in place in the USSR and in the principal nuclear powers were designed for launching a retaliatory strike?

[Golubkov] That is true. When we were thinking about the design of this system, we fully realized that the President is President, that he carries a heavy burden, that it would be too easy for him to just go ahead and simply press the button, without thinking. And so, we avoided making overly aggressive systems.

1.5 Years Ago

"This system has been created for use only in case of an accidental nuclear war, in the event the country suffers a completely unexpected attack. That is, entirely unexpected, like a bolt out of the blue. Then the associated missile attack radio warning systems would give the alarm."

[Umnov] Nonetheless, the system in the final analysis still depends upon people

[Golubkov] Yes. But those people are undergoing constant training. I do not know what schedule they are presently under. At one time the schedule was demanding: a training session held three times in a 24-hour period. For this reason, they possess all the skills they need.

Does the President take part in the training? I do not know.

1.5 Years Ago

"Design of this system began during the time of Brezhnev, but he never did see it. The first General Secretary was Andropov. But that was the time he was hospitalized. About Chernenko there is generally nothing I can say.

When it comes to Gorbachev, well, he knew exactly what the small suitcase was. He was not interested in technical details, however, since he was not a techie."

[Umnov] Eighteen months ago we attempted to speak with the duty operators, to ask them about what they do and how they felt about things, but we did not have any success.

[Golubkov] That was when they encountered great difficulty. In August of 1991, they became hostages of the system, and some of them suffered for no reason. I know nothing about what they are doing now but I would be interested in finding out.

Even An Electric Buzzer Lasts Only So Long

[Golubkov] We had no close contact with the customer for about five years. We did all kinds of trouble-shooting, provided consultation, and read lectures. We later found it necessary to raise the question: How much longer were we to keep the system operational?

The old system was to remain operational until it was replaced by the new one. In the meantime, we were to continue maintaining the old system. But how?

The boys saw the problem in a simple light: Why fool around? If the system is needed, pay us; if not, say so, and we could feel free to go wherever we wish.

[Umnov] Perhaps you believe that it really is not needed.

[Golubkov] In my opinion, that is why we have a higher political leadership: So that it can bear this burden while the system is in operation.

[Umnov] But you cannot keep on repairing it without end.

[Golubkov] The higher leadership is still unaware of all these problems. Subordinates report that it is working. So what is there to worry about? When the suitcase becomes a real problem, that will be a different story.

[Umnov] Can that actually occur?

[Golubkov] Absolutely.

[Umnov] In this situation, are we talking specifically about our not being able - God forbid! - to control nuclear weapons?

[Golubkov] That is not the problem. When we were making the equipment, we imposed serious requirements. There are special organizations that carry out experiments and perform analytical computations. It is necessary to make certain that, if the equipment does break down, it must not be the cause of unexpected consequences.

[Umnov] Then a breakdown is possible?

[Golubkov] Yes. We ran all sorts of computations and proofs: In the event a microcircuit fails, that is not

serious. No one has performed system checks. When everything in the device or in the chain breaks down all at once, something unpredictable may occur. Erroneous data may be produced or data may become distorted in transmission, even though we built in a high degree of reliability.

No Orders From Ukraine For Creation Of Its Own System

[Umnov] It is my understanding that the complex Soviet system consisted of something like 100 stations located throughout the territory, and that the stations were linked to a single command station. Then the Union fell apart. Was the number of stations drastically reduced?

[Golubkov] No, the stations were not tied to the territory; they were tied to the military hierarchy. Equipment was located in Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. The equipment located in Belorussia was limited; it was taken out of service and is being prepared for destruction. Kazakhstan said: We are subordinating ourselves to you and are operating as part of your system. In Ukraine's case there arose a problem, which she intends to resolve on her own.

How Much Can One Speculate On the Small Suitcase?

[Umnov] You say that the higher leadership has no idea of what is happening with the strategic nuclear weapon ASU. But before it did. Has there been a breakdown in line of communication? Is it a case of disinformation?

[Golubkov] They have enough problems - political and economic - of their own. We appealed to the President eighteen months ago, and a change for the better seemed to come about, with work initiated on development of some kind of special-purpose program. But that came to a stop; our bureaucratic machine is doing something to hold it in check.

What moved me to action? I recently tuned in to the "Parliamentary Hour" program. Some deputy was presenting his argument against Yeltsin: How can we entrust the small suitcase to him? He is unpredictable. Well, so what? It has been written that the system does not depend upon a president's personality. Regardless of what happens, it operates on principles that are built into it. It cannot do otherwise. It remains in place and will remain so. So forget about it.

So how much can a person speculate on the small suitcase? Were we to propose that the Ministry of Defense issue a brochure written in an easy-to-read style?

[Umnov] Why do you think the politicians have become stuck on the suitcase?

[Golubkov] Because it is a matter of prestige. All the more since this is now in the hands of Yeltsin-Grachev.

1.5 Years Ago

...“The ‘nuclear suitcases’ are now restricted to the President of Russia and the commander-in-chief of the CIS Armed Forces. The third is being held in reserve.”

[Golubkov] The Supreme Soviet has been deprived of this symbol of power. It is possible that the Soviet wants to be given the third piece, to be turned over to Khasbulatov.

[Umnov] What should be done?

[Golubkov] There is one solution: Make a decision about whether a new system is needed or not. If it is needed, then immediately initiate the development and approval of a state special-purpose program that would assure a concentration of system operations within the framework of a state enterprise, whereby the state budget would appropriate funds to employ a limited number of persons: 400 to 450. Only then would it be possible to retain leading specialists.

[Umnov] Do you think you can pick up where you left off?

[Golubkov] Next year it will be much more difficult to do so. After the specialists become settled in their new jobs, there will be no way to get them to leave their jobs. They will have become accustomed to their large salary and will have recovered from the blow they suffered when they lost their old job.

[Umnov] What if funding were to be restored today?

[Golubkov] In two years we would be able to come up with an entirely new design and do the testing. And the equipment could be series-produced. If we retain the people and can keep the equipment operational, we could even continue to maintain the existing system.

There is no other way.

Our suppliers are suffering the same problems.

The Americans are not curtailing their program; they are creating new weapons. The day is not far off when we will have nothing to offer as a counterpart.

[Umnov] Have you made another appeal to the President?

[Golubkov] Alas! The enterprise's leadership does not wish to do this, most likely because of political reasons, and it does not permit us to do so. Our last resort is the press.

[FROM THE EDITORS: We do not know how to get the President's attention away from cabinet intrigues. Is it possible that this frightening warning is sufficient to do that? It seems that there is no longer any hope of handing down this “little problem” to successors. The time has come to do something. That is why we are sending this particular issue of the NYeG to the Kremlin, to the person of the President of Russia.]

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Performance, Specifications of 9K111 ‘Fagot’ ATGM

93UM08324 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Sep 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Yegorov, under the rubric: “Arsenal”: “‘Fagot’: Twenty Three Years in the Regimental ‘Orchestra’”]

[Text] The “Fagot” antitank missile system, like the “Metis” antitank missile system that we discussed in the last installment of “Arsenal” (See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 August), is a second generation ATGM [antitank guided missile] system, that is, semiautomatic. However, in the “table of ranks” “Fagot” is at a level higher thanks first of all to its more powerful missile. This is already a portable ATGM system that is in the motorized-rifle battalion inventory.

The “Fagot” ATGM system has a very laconic and simple design: a missile, a tripod and, on it—a compact guidance device. It is thanks to this device, designed at the Central Scientific-Research Institute of Precision Machine Tools (Klimovsk, Moscow Oblast) truly with Russian elegance, that “Fagot”, and also other ATGM systems of this class have been raised to the level of world standards based upon their specifications. It in no way lags behind the American “Tow” missile—the most significant U.S. achievement in this sphere.

Konstantin Zvyagin and Viktor Kurnosov, the developers of the land-based semi-automatic guidance device, became State Prize laureates. A license for production of “Fagot” has been sold abroad.

Thanks to the universal nature of the 9K111 “Fagot” ground-based system, it is possible to employ not only the 9M111 but also the 9M113 (“Konkurs”) missiles on the same base. And that certainly imparts special effectiveness to this ATGM system.

Primary Tactical-Technical Specifications of the "Fagot" 9M111 Portable ATGM System

Composition	9P135 launcher and its modifications; 9M111 (9M113) antitank missiles
Maximum firing range	
9M111	2,000 meters
9M113	3,500 m
Minimum	70 m
Guidance system	semi-automatic with transmission of commands via communications wire
Rate of fire	3 shots per minute
Weight of the launcher	22.5 kilograms
Weight of the missile in the transport-launch canister	
9M111	13 kg
9M113	25.2 kg
Crew	3 men
Basic ammunition load	8 missiles

Performance, Specifications of 'Shturm-S' ATGM

93UM0834A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Sep 93 p 2

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Aleksandr Yegorov, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "'Shturm' Strikes from Afar"]

[Text] Although the "Metis," "Fagot", and also "Shturm-S" ATGM systems [antitank missile system] which we are discussing today are first and second generation ATGM's, that is, semiautomatic, there are differences in the guidance systems of these missiles. The first two are wire-guided by the operator. "Shturm-S" is radio-guided. This model has thereby been deprived of the primary shortcoming of wire-guided missiles—relatively low speed which, as we know, is limited by the capabilities of the wire unwinding system as it moves.

Qualitative signal selection is utilized in the "Shturm" to transmit the operator's commands via the radio circuit. Each command has been endowed with some sort of quality: frequency, duration, amplitude, etc. In general the guidance system consists of a command encoding unit that is located at the command post and a decoding-execution unit that is located on board the missile. Of all of the possible radio pulses that are received by the receiver, the decoder permits only that group or that duration of them to which it is tuned.

"Shturm-S" is the most powerful of the three ATGM systems being presented by us. It is included in the category of self-propelled ATGM systems and is installed on a 911149 combat vehicle base.

Great effective fire range, protection and high mobility make it indispensable as a tank destroyer during the course of both offensive and defensive operations (the "Shturm-S" ATGM System ensures the destruction of targets at ranges at which aimed fire from tank cannons is impossible).

However, with all of the properties of the second generation ATGM [antitank guided missile], we need to note one substantial circumstance that compels us to conduct a search for new principles of missile guidance: the operator, who has been compelled to track the target during the course of the missile's entire flight, becomes a target for the enemy. That is why work for the development of a third generation ATGM—with semi-active and active guidance systems and target illumination using a laser beam—has become the next step in the development of this type of weaponry. Using these missiles, we can conduct fire from closed fire positions when enemy tank crews cannot see the ATGM operators.

We will acquaint our readers with these systems later.

Primary Tactical-Technical Specifications of the "Shturm-S" Self-Propelled ATGM System

System composition	a 911149 combat vehicle and a 9M114 antitank guided missile
Firing range, meters	
Maximum	5,000
Minimum	400
Guidance system	semi-active with transmission of commands via radio circuit
Rate of fire, shots per minute	3-4
Weight of the combat vehicle, tonnes	12
Weight of the missile and transport-launch canister, kilograms	46.6
Crew, men	2
Basic ammunition load, missiles	12

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES**Air-to-Air Missile Specifications**

93UM0848A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 2, Feb 93 p 11

[Article by Mikhail Levin, under the rubric: "MOSAEROSHOW-93": "'Fired and Forgotten'"]

[Text] Continuation. Beginning in KRYLYA RODINY No 1, 93.

In this issue, we are publishing consolidated tables of these aircraft missiles.

Specification of Domestic and Foreign Air-to-Air Missiles

Model	Class	Guidance	Length, mm	Caliber (diameter), mm	Wing span, mm	Control surface span, mm	Launch weight, kg	Warhead weight, kg	Warhead type	Launch range, km, maximum, minimum	Maximum altitude of destroyed targets, km	G-load of destroyed targets
SHORT-RANGE MISSILES												
R-60	Air-to-Air	Infrared homing	2,100	120			45	3.5		10		
R-73 RMD1	Air-to-Air	Infrared homing	2,900	170	510	Not known	105	8	High-explosive continuous rod	30 0.3	20	12
R-73 RMD2	Air-to-Air	Infrared homing	2,900	170	510	Not known	110	8	High-explosive continuous rod	40 0.3	20	12
AIM-9	Air-to-Air	Infrared homing	2,870	127	630	Not known	86.6	9.5	High-explosive fragmentation	18 Not known	Not known	Not known
R550 "Magic"	Air-to-Air	Infrared homing	2,750	157	660	Not known	90	12.5	High-explosive	10 0.3	Not known	Not known
ASR-AAM	Air-to-Air	Infrared homing	2,900	166	Not known	Not known	87		Not known	15 0.3	Not known	Not known
MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES												
R-27AE	Air-to-Air	Inertial guidance with radio update + active radar homing	4,780	260	800	970	350	39	High-explosive continuous rod	130 0.5	27	8
R-27R	Air-to-Air	Inertial guidance with radio update + semi-active radar homing	4,080	230	770	970	253	39	High-explosive continuous rod	80 0.5	25	8
R-27RE	Air-to-Air	Inertial guidance with radio update + semi-active radar homing	4,780	260	800	970	350	39	High-explosive continuous rod	130 0.5	27	8
R-27T	Air-to-Air	Infrared homing	3,795	230	770	970	254	39	High-explosive continuous rod	72 0.5	24	8
R-27TE	Air-to-Air	Infrared homing	4,500	260	800	970	343	39	High-explosive continuous rod	120 0.5	30	8
R-27EM	Air-to-Air	Inertial guidance with radio update + semi-active radar homing	4,780	260	800	970	350	39	High-explosive continuous rod	170 0.5	27	8
R-77 (RVV-AYe)	Air-to-Air	Active radar homing	3,600	300	Not known	Not known	175	Not known	Not known	90 Not known	Not known	12

Specification of Domestic and Foreign Air-to-Air Missiles (continued)

Model	Class	Guidance	Length, mm	Caliber (diameter), mm	Wing span, mm	Control surface span, mm	Launch weight, kg	Warhead weight, kg	Warhead type	Launch range, km, maximum, minimum	Maximum altitude of destroyed targets, km	G-load of destroyed targets
MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES (continued)												
AIM-7M	Air-to-Air	Semi-active radar homing	3,700	200	1,000	Not known	228	40	High-explosive continuous rod	100 0.6	Not known	Not known
Sky Flash	Air-to-Air	Semi-active radar homing	3,700	203	1,020	Not known	192.3	30	High-explosive continuous rod	50 Not known	Not known	Not known
AIM-120 (AMR-AAM)	Air-to-Air	Inertial guidance with active radar homing	3,650	178	526	Not known	156.5	20	Fragmentation	75 Not known	Not known	Not known
MICA	Air-to-Air	Inertial guidance + semi-active radar homing or Infrared homing	3,100	Not known	Not known	Not known	110	10	High-explosive	60 Not known	Not known	Not known
LONG-RANGE MISSILES												
R-33E	Air-to-Air	Inertial guidance + semi-active radar homing	4,150	380	900	1,180	490	47	High-explosive-Fragmentation	120 Not known	28	Not known
AIM-54	Air-to-Air	Inertial guidance + semi-active radar homing	4,000	380	915	Not known	443	60	High-explosive continuous rod	200 Not known	Not known	Not known

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Black Sea Fleet Issues Examined

934E1308B Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Sep 93
Night Edition p 1

[Article by Viktor Badurkin: "The Black Sea Fleet: Another Storm Has Rolled In"]

[Text]

They Burned the Russian Flag

"Ukraine is on the threshold of war"—leaflets like this appeared in Lvov on Sunday. Propaganda material was also disseminated at a rally, which was not big because of the rain and penetrating cold. It was held next to the opera theater. The crowd of 2,000 persons witnessed the burning of the Russian tricolor.

This protest action was organized by the Committee to Save the Honor of the Nation and the State, which was established two days ago in Lvov. The committee came out with a demand for the "resignation of traitor-President Leonid Kravchuk, who gave the Black Sea Fleet and nuclear weapons to Russia," and also for the removal from their posts of the President's representatives "who are conducting a policy of betrayal and compromise."

Arithmetic Is Also Important in Politics

"In the end what happened was what we had suggested as early as the beginning of the year," was the comment made on the Black Sea Fleet agreement of the presidents of Russia and Ukraine by Admiral Kasatonov, its former commanding officer, at the request of TRUD. "I am confident that it conforms to the interests of both the Russians and the inhabitants of the Crimea, especially those of Sevastopol, and, of course, of the sailors."

As the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Kasatonov emphasized that the Russian Black Sea Fleet will also defend the interests of Ukraine in the region, including guarding fishing and border and customs zones, and resolving other problems. "I am glad that common sense is winning and that the fleet will remain united," the admiral declared, "but it will still be necessary to work hard for this: Everything has to be calculated and divided to mutual satisfaction. But problems may arise here. After all the fleet comprises not only ships..."

Kasatonov's fears are also shared by specialists of the Main Staff of the Navy. After all, in accordance with the protocol signed in the Crimea "On Settling the Problems of the Black Sea Fleet," in a matter of two months the state delegations of both sides are supposed "to look into all questions associated with the development of the agreement, in accordance with which

the entire Black Sea Fleet with its infrastructure in the Crimea is used by Russia and acquires Russian symbols, with the understanding that the Russian side will conduct appropriate settlements for that half of the Black Sea Fleet, including the infrastructure, which by virtue of previous agreements was supposed to pass to Ukraine."

It is apparent from the text of the protocol that the specialists will have something over which to rack their brains. In two years both the composition of the fleet and its disposition have changed, and, indeed, prices are different from what they were formerly. We note that the document does not say a word about the units of the Navy that are deployed in Ukraine but are not part of the Black Sea Fleet, and about border guard subunits and bases outside the Crimea. During these years there has also been a change in the sailors' financing. According to the words of Admiral Feliks Gromov, Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, this year Russia's share of financial support for the Black Sea Fleet was 83.3 percent, Ukraine's share—a total of 16.7 percent.

But this is not the main thing. Will this agreement be ratified? Leonid Kravchuk said that the final decision on the fleet has not yet been made, and that "the question has only been posed." In his turn, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev reassured journalists that the participation in the work in the Crimea of First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament Vasyl Durdynets, and especially the fact that he did not express himself against, makes it possible to hope that "Leonid Makarovych already had an agreement with the Supreme Council of Ukraine in reserve."

Whatever the case may be, the ice has been broken, and the document, which the Black Sea Fleet sailors have been waiting for, has been signed, and the committee workers can start to work any day now.

Black Sea Fleet Meeting Results

934E1308A Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Sep 93
Night Edition p 1

[Article by Stanyslav Prokopchuk: "The Black Sea Fleet: Another Storm Has Rolled In"]

[Text]

The Ship Is Listing

Yalta-Kiev—Hardly anyone could foresee these precise results of the high-level negotiations held last Friday at the unique forest and park zone of Yalta, at "Stalin's little house," known to a wider circle of persons under the name "Shater" [Tent]. When after five hours of negotiations the presidents of Russia and Ukraine descended in their vehicles (together with

their prime ministers) to the Massandra palace and announced at an eight-minute news conference the main results on the principal problems of the negotiations—the Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine's strategic weapons—many people were shocked. Colleagues from Ukrainian publications commented that what was said at the express-conference was the "eight-minute disgrace of Ukraine," and "the beginning of the end of Leonid Kravchuk."

The general results of the meeting are already well known. But it is necessary first to say a few words about the atmosphere of the negotiations, because according to the statements of the participants it had a direct and indirect effect on the results. As noted after the news conference by V. Kostikov, the Russian President's press secretary, "the talks proceeded in a rather rigid and strict manner. The meeting was not adequately prepared." According to the words of another person, this time a confidential source of information, the tone of the negotiations with respect to the Ukrainian side was aggressive, at times in the nature of pressing, "justified" by Ukraine's colossal indebtedness to Russia for energy sources and the catastrophic financial and economic situation in which it has found itself.

But the whole world already knows the results of the presidents' negotiations: An agreement in principle was reached on the variant that was unequivocally rejected the day before by the Ukrainian government delegation—Ukraine transfers part of its half of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia as payment of indebtedness for energy sources.

A bilateral commission was established in order to determine how much to pay to whom, whether Ukraine will be able to manage its own indebtedness in the book value of ships being transferred, and what generally is the full value of the entire fleet, of its Ukrainian part, and of the Black Sea Fleet bases in Sevastopol and other cities, rayons, and settlements. It is supposed to make a determination on every aspect of the problem in question during September. Leonid Kravchuk declared that it is only after this that "Ukraine will examine the question of the sale of its part of the fleet to Russia." As for the second part of the question on the base of the Black Sea Fleet, this also will be resolved, according to the words of the President of Ukraine, only after a study by experts and lawyers.

It is precisely these and other clarifications and stipulations with which the President of Ukraine supplemented or "corrected" the unambiguous and essentially categorical answers of the president of Russia to journalists' questions that evoke great doubts. First, will implementation of the agreement of the presidents on the Black Sea Fleet follow exactly the scheme

dictated by Boris Yeltsin's "homework" and, in this context, by the statements he and Minister of Defense of Russia P. Grachev made on their return to Moscow? In any case, Leonid Kravchuk already made it known at Borispol airport that there was no such unambiguous and clear agreement on the transfer to Russia of the entire Ukrainian Fleet and the entire infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet. And Minister of Defense of Ukraine Konstantin Morozov, after essentially confirming these words, noted in his statement to the press that from a defense point of view he considers such a statement of the question to be unacceptable without an examination of the problem of the withdrawal of the Russian Fleet outside the boundaries of Ukraine. He insists on the need to examine this problem at the Defense Council for its transmission for ratification by the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

Second, apparently not everything will be as smooth as was initially perceived from the answers of the presidents regarding the implementation by the Ukrainian side of three documents on the strategic nuclear weapons of Ukraine that were signed at the prime minister level. Although it is exactly on this problem that the negotiations were the most constructive and prepared.

Now, the main question remains whether the Supreme Council of Ukraine will ratify the START I Treaty, without which the dismantling and dispatch to Russia of warheads from Ukrainian strategic nuclear missiles will not begin, despite the fact that the military specialists already have a coordinated exact program of overall action. And whether the Ukrainian parliament will now give its okay to the president and the prime minister to sign the treaty on an economic union, which it has rejected until now.

"This is national betrayal." This is the way Vyacheslav Chornovil, Chairman of the People's Rukh of Ukraine [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika] characterized the contents of L. Kravchuk's principal agreements with B. Yeltsin on the Black Sea Fleet. Ivan Zayets, chairman of the opposition faction of Rukh in parliament, called the actions of L. Kravchuk in the negotiations in Yalta a betrayal of the Ukrainian nation, which have brought national catastrophe closer, and from which, in his opinion, it can be saved only by a democratic revolution...

But Ivan Vasilyevich Zaytsev, a well-known veteran of the Black Sea Fleet and a participant in the liberation of Sevastopol, thinks that the agreements of the presidents on the Black Sea Fleet did not permit any real dismemberment of the enormous organism of the fleet, and that they took into account the position of official Crimea in the part on nondivision of the fleet...

In a word, perceptions of the results of the Yalta meeting in Ukraine are ambiguous and contradictory.

Indeed, it cannot be otherwise. Implementation of the agreements is another matter. L. Kravchuk's position poured oil on the fire of the very acute socio-political atmosphere in the country, which stands on the brink of a crisis of authority, the possible resignation both of the Supreme Council and the team of Leonid Kuchma, and, right behind them, possibly the president as well. That is why the reasonable question today is who will implement the Massandra decisions tomorrow, and will they be implemented at all?

Government Blasted in Fleet Deal

934K23864 Kiev *MOLOD UKRAINY* (Ukrainian)
7 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Volodymyr Oliynyk: "Our Behavior is Not Fortuitous"]

[Text] The meeting between the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, and the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, in Masandra, a meeting which took place on 3 September—has been commented upon in various different ways by the Ukrainian, Russian, and foreign mass media. Even the principal persons involved—i.e., the presidents of these two independent states—have interpreted the results, to put it mildly, quite differently with regard to the negotiations concerning the Black Sea Fleet—one which carries nuclear weapons in Ukraine. But let's not try to talk about that here and now, especially inasmuch as the President of Ukraine intends to hold a press conference on this matter at a time when this issue of our newspaper will have already gone to press. We certainly will inform you about this, dear readers! Today we want to focus our attention on the following urgent problem: Why, in pointed fact, was Ukraine unprepared for this meeting, and why did it have to play the role of a vassal to whom the rules of the game were dictated?

Among the many causes which brought about such a twisted situation for the young Ukrainian state, economic experts and recent staffers of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers have cited the absence in Ukraine of a government capable of reforming the economy. Instead, it continues to keep the state sector afloat, thus providing a minimum of stability and profits.

The behavior of the Ukrainian delegation during negotiations was not a direct consequence of the government's incompetence—a government which, by inertia, is still called a government of experts. But what reforms are we talking about? Privatization has been put to flight, and the issue of providing supplies of energy sources is still extremely tense. Its resolution has been postponed to the beginning of next year. International financial aid has not arrived in Ukraine, and so we cannot even dream about the stabilization of a fund for Ukrainian hard currency.

Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma, who is constantly railing against his lack of plenipotentiary powers, has—in fact—not influenced the development of the economic situation in this state. As observed by People's Deputy Volodymyr Pylypchuk, Kuchma instead plays to the public. He demands these plenipotentiary powers but—in point of fact—has become reconciled to the present state of affairs.

If all the details were brought to light, we could draw the conclusion that—to a significant degree—the situation in which the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, and the prime minister, Leonid Kuchma, found themselves in Masandra during the negotiations was conditioned by the incompetence of the Ukrainian government—one which has brought the economy of this state to such a lamentable state of affairs. Indeed, Ukraine—in receiving the Russian delegation on its own territory—presented its own interests as those of a bankrupt state.

For even during the existing crisis-type conditions—when the government of Leonid Kravchuk undertook to man the levers of the economy—there was the possibility, if not to pull the economy out of its crisis, at least to lay the foundation of future changes. But this foundation was not laid in Ukraine. In the latter country the class of entrepreneurs and owners is too small and scattered; but this cannot be said of Russia. The domestic political situation is not a simple one there, but the owners—buttressed by privatization—have already become a genuine force to be reckoned with—one which does not fear either the Red or the Brown extremists, nor the pro-communist parliament, nor the national-patriots.

But who can the Ukrainian government or the President rely upon?

The Navy and Russian National Security

934 MD7604 Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK* in Russian
No. 6 Jan 93 (signed to press 22 Jun 93) pp 3-12

[Article by Retired Admiral A. Mikhaylovskiy, active member of the Academy of Natural Sciences of the Russian Federation and professor, and Rear-Admiral (Res.) V. Lebedko, candidate of military sciences: "Russia's National Security and the Navy"]

[Text]

1. The Geopolitical Situation and National Interests

Recently, Russia has ended up in a completely new geopolitical situation. It is caused primarily by the catastrophic defeat of the USSR in the political and economic confrontation with the West, as a result of which without war it lost 14 percent of its territory,

half of the population, and also tremendous intellectual, cultural, and material values belonging to it as a unified state. A shaky and unstable structure was formed in place of the Soviet Union—the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia, the heir of the Soviet Union, also ended up in a maelstrom of destructive processes and is moving at a fast pace toward losing its world importance, acquired and accumulated over preceding decades, becoming increasingly politically and economically dependent on countries of the West.

The collapse of the USSR also undermined the relatively stable balance in the world and marked the end of the bipolar geopolitical system. The charge of global international tension of enormous strength is finding its "bloody" solution in the most complex and not very predictable regional conflicts, including military, taking place either at Russia's borders or in direct proximity to them. In addition, the situation that has taken shape in the world is also characterized by other important features. The military-political role of the United States as an international leader for establishing a so-called "new world order" has strengthened considerably. A powerful united Germany has emerged in the West, laying claim to the role of the central force in Europe. In the East, the international importance of China and Japan as most powerful states, not only of the region but of the whole world, has increased. In the South, states united by the ideology of Islam are moving forward more and more actively in the struggle for regional hegemony. Thus, the growing economic and resource concentration in a number of countries is leading to the formation of new geopolitical centers of power: in Europe, in the Asian and Pacific region, and in the Near and Middle East.

Unfortunately, in Russia itself the situation is characterized by an increasing political instability, destruction of the economy, a decrease in the population's standard of living, isolation of autonomies, and an intensification of foreign influence in political, economic, and military areas. Despite this, however, Russia still possesses a powerful military-economic potential as one of the most important factors capable of ensuring its revival and restoring its rightful status as a superpower. Therefore, many theoreticians and practical persons both in our country and abroad are trying to predict the place that Russia will occupy in the new geopolitical conditions. The amplitude of such predictions is quite wide: from the possibility of Russia's revival as a major European country with integration into the European Community to its development as a great Asian and Pacific power. However, the swing of the theoretical "pendulum" is gradually decreasing, increasingly pointing toward an inclining of Russia's present course in the direction of dependence on the United States of America. However, sensible politicians are far from attempts to predict Russia's revival

as a great pro-American power, because this is about as serious as looking for support in Europe or Asia, having found room for itself Russia would have found its revival with the status of a equal world power.

Today Russia is being roused into action in the quest for an optimal orientation, but hardly anyone other than ourselves are concerned about its fate. It is obvious that Russia's revival is needed most of all by its people, and only its own forces can blaze a trail to it, as happened more than once during difficult periods of Russian history. Thus, the sum total of the conditions formed by the new geopolitical situation have made it necessary for us to conduct an active search for conceptual substantiations of the state's domestic and foreign policy. Obviously, awareness of our country's national interests must serve as the main motive in accomplishing this most complex task.

The concept of "national interests" is a commonly used term and at the same time one of the most difficult to explain. We often use it, but very rarely make it specific. It seems that not only Russia but also the majority of other states today do not have a clearly expressed presentation of their national interests, for formulating the basic tenets encompassing their entire spectrum at a specific historical stage is far from a simple task. Nevertheless, statesmen, politicians, economists, military, and even columnists often refer to these interests in their statements.

Today, the predominance in society of three basic world outlooks influences the formation of our ideas on this issue: Marxism-Leninism, so-called "new thinking," and subjective-idealistic American pragmatism. A feature of the current stage is not so much the polarization of these world outlooks as, on the contrary, their vulgar mixing, which is apparent both from statements by officials and from articles in the mass media. Any ideologization of the issue is rejected in words, but only the desire to dissociate oneself from previous methodological approaches is demonstrated in deed.

It is known that in accordance with the generally accepted definition, any interest is the real reason for actions. For example, one cannot imagine a healthy person without any interest in life. They say: the person lost interest in life, and naturally what follows is the finish line, the length of which depends on the remaining physical resources. By the way, when interest in life is lost, the need to ensure safety also disappears. Therefore, we believe the following thesis will be fair: interest is a vital stimulus for a person, family, society, nation, or state as a whole. Thus, by national interests we apparently mean the real reason for purposeful actions of a nation or state aimed at its survival, functioning, and development. Based on this, we believe that Russia's main general interests now

are: preserving and strengthening its territorial integrity and independence; establishing truly democratic institutions of power; achieving political stability and social harmony of the people; creating an efficient economy; safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the country's population and on this basis complete satisfaction of the population's material and spiritual needs. As before, preservation of peace and life and friendship with all peoples remains an indisputable "interest" of Russia. Therefore, the range of Russia's national interests as a state linked by mutual relations with almost the entire world is extremely great. It encompasses vast masses of people, sociopolitical structures, other states, and continental, maritime, air, and even outer spaces.

As is known, interests may form and develop, arise and fade away, and also be imposed and even suppressed from the outside. Thus, the formation of Russia's national maritime interests date back to ancient times. Throughout its history, Russia has stood the open seas, and the periods of revival of Russian power were always associated with restoration of its national maritime interests. Originally, these interests were associated with extraction of marine animals and fish as food products and with commercial navigation, which brought the Slavic peoples closer to other countries. With the development of statehood, merchant shipping was a major catalyst in development of the country's economy and safeguarding its political and economic interests. This was understood back during the times before Peter the Great; however, Peter the Great did not just bring Russia to the sea, but he also strengthened this outlet by creating the Russian Navy. Later, historical experience graphically showed that when we forgot about the Navy and drove the country's economy inside, it withered and died. Then we lost wars, and the country's population suffered through starvation and economic ruin.

In the late 1980's, the Soviet Union was one of the largest naval powers of the world. Having developed 35 percent of its maritime coastline (of 47,000 km), the country had a merchant fleet that ranked fifth in the world in gross registered capacity and a fishing fleet equal in size to the that of the United States and ranking second in the world in extraction of fish, and unique scientific research vessels plied the oceans and seas. The USSR Navy was second in the world in combat capabilities. Even a specific navigation policy was formulated as a key element of all state policy aimed at economic cooperation with other states, accomplishing foreign trade shipments, and satisfying the needs of the national economy to safeguard the country's national maritime interests. Suffice it to say that maritime transport has provided 70 percent of all foreign trade freight traffic. Beside transport and fishing activities, the sphere of national maritime interests also included development of the ocean's

mineral resources in territorial waters and adjacent and economic zones with a total area roughly equal to the Arctic Ocean or the territories of India, China, and Mongolia together. In addition to this, tasks of safeguarding international maritime law, fulfilling international obligations, protecting shipping against piracy, protecting fishing zones, and presence in areas of concentration of interests of a number of states (Mediterranean Sea, East China Sea, Arctic Ocean, and Indian Ocean), ecological, search and rescue, research, tourism, military, and other issues are resolved in the country's interests in oceans and seas. An entire production infrastructure for processing mineral and food products, imported and exported raw materials, desalination of sea water, and use of the ocean's energy resources has emerged on seacoast.

Such were our country's maritime interests during the course of their formation and development from one century to the next. However, in the early 1990's, the centrifugal political processes untwisted by the "new thinking" changed the geopolitical map of the world. As a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia's forward boundaries in the West and South ended up thrown back 300 years, meaning that its innumerable sacrifices in the struggle to gain access to the seas and in protecting its national maritime interests were essentially in vain. Only 22 percent of the developed seacoast, and Arctic ice and desolate Pacific shores account for a huge number of kilometers of coastline. Together with other values, Russia lost nearly half of the merchant fleet and sea ports. The Baltic Fleet has suffered tremendous damage, and the Black Sea Fleet today can no longer be considered a combat-capable operational-strategic formation of Russia's armed forces. What is more, under the influence of radical left-wing revision of Russian and Soviet foreign policy, in addition to loss of the Baltic region and Crimea, the problem of the southern Kuril Islands is being fanned with great force, and the Russian Navy's access to the Pacific Ocean is being threatened, along with Russia's traditional historical interests in the Far East.

2. National Interests and Security

The increasing territorial claims against Russia along virtually the entire perimeter of its borders, development of international and regional conflicts, the danger of nuclear weapons crawling away in different directions, political and economic instability, and also the continuing processes of disintegration within Russia itself are placing safeguarding security among one of the top places among its national interests.

Modern politology understands national security as the lack of danger, confidence of people and states as a whole in the fact that they are being protected against possible dangers and their future will be what it should be according to their own notions. Every historical

period had filled and enriched the content of the concept of security. Whereas originally it assumed only guarantees of personal physical survival of a person, it later took on the nature of protecting his family, his tribe, and his property until it was transformed into protection of the whole nation and state. Methods of safeguarding such security also developed over the centuries: from ditches and fences to locks, fortresses, and fortified areas, from personal weapons to regular troops and navies, and finally ensuring parity in strategic armaments of opposing states. Thus, security traditionally has been safeguarded with military force.

But the times are changing. Thus, the impossibility of victory in a nuclear war, in spite of the colossal amount of military might, and the senselessness of further building up of the already huge amount of arms brought about a reconsideration of the place of military force in the current stage of development of mankind. Today, political, economic, and technological factors are moving to the front positions among priorities ensuring national security. In addition to them, geopolitical, ecological, genetic, intellectual, and other factors are of considerable importance, that is, everything that ensures not only survival (defense and protection) but also the functioning and development of the society, nation, and state. Such an interpretation of national security, apparently, should be understood as the sum total of factors ensuring the vital activities and progressive development of the state in the system of international relations and its ability to defend its independence in accordance with its national interests.

In talking about the priorities in security at the present stage, one must not forget that the military dimension of policy is steadily present in foreign policy thinking both in the West and in the East, being a reflection of the continued weightiness of the military factor. Suffice it to say that wars have practically not stopped on earth since the end of World War II. Today, there are wars and armed conflicts going on in 26 countries, including the territory of the Soviet Union. It seems that the world, having avoided threats of self-destruction in a nuclear missile war, has moved to a more unstable situation.

It should be recognized that the main force forming the external danger for Russia is still the United States with its powerful armed forces and the ever-increasing claims on a "unipolar" world order. And if there is no direct military threat to Russia on the part of any country of the West or East, as many politicians maintain, there is still a danger of war. It lies in the exhaustibility of natural resources and favorable ecological spaces, which more and more often are the key cause of political and economic confrontations between countries.

There is a great temptation in these conditions to subjugate to oneself the enormous and very rich territories of the former Soviet Union and the presently weakened Russia, which can thus become an arena in the struggle for a new re-division of the world.

Among the priorities in the area of military affairs one should also note the aspiration, by virtue of the ecological "damage potential" of the existing weapons of mass destruction, to search for new physical principles of action for new models of arms and introduce the latest technologies. These weapons, according to the plans of their creators, should negate the capabilities of nuclear missile weapons and the efforts of those countries that are trying to preserve or create them. Behind the noisy political declarations of reducing and eliminating arms is in fact a search for a breakthrough to creating more effective and ecologically clean weapons. For example, the signing of the SALT-2 Treaty gives the United States the opportunity to carry out its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Program at a faster pace with fewer expenditures.

A complex situation also remains in Russia itself, which may become a detonator for explosive world processes. During the course of the political and theoretical debates taking place in our country on questions of security, two basic views on the way of achieving it have clearly manifested themselves. First is the desire to achieve recognition of the unity of national and universal interests with their orientation on universal security. It is proposed to create a system of global protection with Russia's transfer of some of the functions of national security to the Pentagon, which also does not rule out the transfer of its strategic nuclear forces to general operational control. As proponents of this line believe, basically adherents of the so-called "new thinking" ideology oriented on unrestrained political and economic integration with the West, by "addition of forces" in the situation at hand they will be able to keep Russia from further breakup and safeguard its external security. They advance the slogan of creating a unified universal system of international regulated law and order. However, this idea is somewhat similar to the slogans of German fascism that are well-known to our people.

The other side views the integrity and independence of Russia as a fundamental national interest of the state. They believe that Russia's external security must be safeguarded by its own forces and assets, sufficient for an effective rebuff to any potential aggressor, and its internal security must be achieved by overcoming the economic crisis, achieving national unity, and establishing political and social stability in the country. A number of political analysts believe that we now need a powerful political beginning to consolidate all the peoples populating Russia.

These are two views, the first of which, in our opinion, is preferred more by the present Russian leadership. In this lies the entire complexity of the situation, in which the question of national security and the role of Russia's Navy in achieving it must be considered, although in precisely these conditions it would naive not to see that military might, as before, must remain an instrument of reasonable policy and a reliable guarantee of the revival of Russia and safeguarding its national security.

3. Security and the Navy

An examination of the role of the Navy in Russia's history, its formation and economic development shows that in all stages of the country's life, a powerful navy corresponding to the interests of a power was necessary as part of the country's armed forces. For centuries it performed the traditional missions of destroying enemy naval forces and gaining naval supremacy, seizing and holding new territories and protecting its own coastline, political pressure, and ensuring economic development. During Soviet times, the main purpose of the navy was to prevent aggression and protect the fatherland from maritime axes. For decades our need for powerful naval forces was introduced into the consciousness of the society.

Today the political scenery has changed all at once, and yesterday's adversaries are declared partners and even allies. "Alluring" ideas of "new thinking" about the universal nature of interests common to all mankind, taken seriously only in Russia, incidentally, and also their expression in the new defensive doctrine, military business, and the collapse of the Soviet Union inflicted a disarming blow against the armed forces, including, naturally, the Navy. Further reassessment of the foreign political situation singled out three main external dangers, seemingly having little to do with the Navy: territorial claims against Russia; the crawling away of nuclear weapons throughout the world; and the unpredictable development of inter-ethnic conflicts in the outlying areas of Russia.

Having tilted towards regional conflicts and having seen this as the primary danger, the Russian military-political leadership thus re-examined the priorities of development of the armed forces, as a result of which the Navy's already modest proportion of the military budget decreased even more. Funds were significantly reduced for scientific-research and experimental design work and procurement of equipment and armament for the Navy, simultaneously with the sharp rise in their cost. In 1992, only 25 percent of the funds from the 1991 level were allocated for all ships located at shipyards. The program adopted for reducing the number of ships with surpassing personnel cuts may once and for all lead to the destruction of the Navy. As

far as the Navy is concerned, today most often everything is mentioned in combination with the words "reduction," "utilization," "improving the organizational structures," and "demobilization," and only "participation in operations of multinational forces" can be considered as some life-giving injection for it. Even a superficial analysis makes it possible to see that in response to the question: What kind of a navy does Russia need and why?—after American geopoliticians who maintain that Russia (unlike the United States) is a purely continental power, many "prominent experts" here give preference the formula "RUSSIA NEEDS THE KIND OF NAVY IT NEEDS." This immediately frees us from many things: from the concept of organizational development of the Navy, from searching for funds for its organizational development and upkeep, from independent operational-tactical thinking, and from everything that is such a burden for the state today.

Meanwhile, the role of the Navy goes far beyond the framework of narrow-minded concepts of activities of armed forces. It is generally known that the Navy is a component part of the state's maritime power, including, in addition to it the transport and fishing fleets, production fleet for developing ocean resources, scientific research organizations for studying the world's oceans, the system of ports and navigation, and other components of the infrastructure. In interpretation of the definition of national security adopted by us, the Navy is not only a component part of the armed forces but also a key element of the state's maritime might supporting the vital activities of all the rest of its components in accordance with Russia's national interests. Thus, in addition to the traditional military-political function, the Navy also bears economic principles in its activities. This is a most important conclusion for understanding the Navy's role in today's conditions.

From a historical standpoint, it is quite obvious that the Navy's role and importance in Russia's national security system are manifested in the political, economic, socio-moral, and military areas.

In the political area it is possible to achieve the set goal with the least material outlays. There are enough examples of such use of the Navy in our history. Let us recall just the inclusion of the Crimea as part of Russia in 1783 without war, but thanks to its supremacy on the Black Sea, the sealing off of our squadron instituted in 1833 at Bosphorus, the expanding of war between Egypt and Turkey, the foiling of foreign intervention in the United States in 1863 by squadrons of the Russian Navy headed to the shores of America. Both in our times and in 1967, during the conflict between Egypt and Israel, the entrance of ships of the Soviet Navy into the Mediterranean Sea produced "quick successes of our diplomacy" in ending it. In addition, it is known

that official visits and port calls to foreign ports by military ships make a significant contribution to improving mutual understanding between peoples and strengthening Russia's prestige. Such visits alone accomplish two most important political tasks: demonstration of the economic might and friendliness of Russia.

Thus, the navy is a most important political instrument of a state's foreign policy, and if Russia needs such an instrument, then it needs the Navy.

In the economic area, the influence of the ocean is enormous and multifaceted. The reserves of mineral raw materials the world's oceans make it possible to compensate for the swiftly decreasing reserves on the continents and ensure development of the economies of the states of the world. Overall reserves of pure metals alone exceed land reserves by 800-1000 times, and forecast reserves of oil and gas in the world's oceans are 311-312 billion tonnes (1975 data) and are constantly being updated.

International agreements determining the status of the world's oceans view them as objects possessing global unity and immunity of "belonging to no one." This circumstance has given rise to a very sharp struggle for dividing up the total legacy of humankind, that is, all those riches which are in the waters of the ocean, on its bottom, and in the depth of its bottom. Today the world has reached the point where the process is increasingly shifting from diplomatic disputes for the spheres of using the ocean to the practice of threats, economic sanctions, and military pressure. For example, just in the struggle for fishing zones, things have reached the point of "codfish," "lobster," and "tuna" wars using naval forces.

Russia's economic zone in the world oceans is huge, and only an insignificant part of it has been explored, and even what is known is virtually unprotected and uncontrolled. What is more, we have already voluntarily given up to the United States part of our shelf in the Bering Sea and are feeling pressure to transfer another section north of the straits of the same name. You see, the ability of the Americans to introduce themselves into new areas and subordinate them to themselves, as was the case with 70 percent of the drilling platforms in the North Sea, is well known to everyone. We also should not forget the fact that ocean fishing areas account for more than 80 percent of the total fish production in Russia. Our Navy has already frequently had to send warships to problem areas to protect Russia's fishing fleet.

The task of protecting commercial shipping is also traditional for the Navy, which must be done both during wartime and peacetime. Today, the ever-increasing interdependence of countries on freedom of oceanic trade routes has led to "tanker" warfare and

acts of piracy and terrorism at sea. Therefore, it would be unwise not to take into account the fact that Russia's maritime commercial and economic ties encompass more than 100 countries of the world.

However, in ensuring freedom of the activities of transport and fishing fleets and maritime assets conducting search and exploration of ocean resources, the Navy fulfills not only a security role. By the very fact of its existence, it makes it possible to accomplish sovereign activities of the state on the world's oceans.


Therefore, if Russia, its people, and development of its economy need the ocean's resources, freedom of maritime trade, and safety of fishing, then it also needs a navy.

In the socio-moral area, the principal value is people, who must be viewed not only as a mobilization resource of the navy but also as an intellectual potential of Russia. It can be said that this area especially manifests itself in conditions of economic, moral, and cultural crisis in the country.

Military shipbuilding has come to a standstill. Some ships are dying at the piers, others are being scrapped, and those that are left are becoming more and more difficult to service and maintain. Not only combat-ready equipment but also fleet personnel have ended up in the funnel of business and conversion. In this connection, there is a reassessment of the traditional concepts of military duty and protection of the fatherland, and the motivation for military service.

But the sea and naval service to the homeland live persistently in the national historical memory of the people. Dozens of societies have emerged in the country in recent years that have some or other naval orientation. New maritime journals and books on the history of the navy are being published and disseminated, considerably more than on any other military or historical subject matter. The progressive public in the country is actively preparing to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy. It is apparent from all this that the national instinct of self-preservation among the elite of the Russian Navy, the native Russian intelligentsia, and other sections of society has worked. It is simply impossible not to make note of this social impulse.

The Navy's 300 years did not pass without a trace for the intellectual and moral potential of Russia. The Navy has given the country a brilliant assemblage of remarkable officers and scientists, designers and inventors, writers and artists, teachers and pioneers. The best qualities of Russian sailors were concentrated layer after layer in each generation of Russians. Naval leaders admirals F.F. Ushakov, P.S. Nakhimov, S.O. Makarov, and N.G. Kuznetsov; navigators F.P. Litke-



M.P. Lazarev, G.I. Nevelskoy, and F.P. Vrangeli; ship-builders I.A. Amosov, I.G. Bubnov, and N.N. Isanin; scientists M.V. Lomonosov, L. Eyler, and A.N. Krylov; inventors and engineers A.S. Popov, A.F. Mozhayskiy, and A.I. Berg; mining engineer B.B. Golitsyn; physicians D.S. Samoylovich, I.I. Dzhanelidze, and K.M.

Bykov; men of letters V.I. Dal, K.M. Stanyukovich, and L.S. Sobolev; artists V.V. Vereshchagin and A.P. Bogolyubov; composer N.A. Rimskiy-Korsakov; and many, many others brought worldwide glory to Russia, participating in amassing its intellectual wealth. Therefore, it must become Russia's national interest to be

concerned about how to preserve and protect against extinction and social degradation the best personnel of the Navy, the scientific potential of higher naval educational institutions and scientific research institutions, and the scientific-technical and work potential of enterprises operating in this area.

A Russia being brought back to life will very soon require a new quality of navy. But it takes years and years to build a ship at the level of modern technology, and decades are needed to make them work in the interests of the country. **Therefore, if Russia wishes to preserve the prosperity of our nation, it must preserve the Navy.**

In the military area the navy, being a component part of the country's armed forces, is intended for protecting the state's political and economic interests, maritime boundaries, territorial integrity, and independence. In its composition and capabilities, the navy must correspond to the overall strategic concept of deterring a potential adversary and be able to put a stop to and repel aggression from any maritime axis.

It is perfectly obvious that the objective of the actions and the tasks which the Navy must accomplish to prevent aggression or during the course of war, and the forms and scale of these actions must correspond to the composition and equipment of the Navy. They should be examined differentially depending on the forces of potential adversaries and their capabilities. Apparently, it is necessary to update some of our past operational-strategic views toward employing naval forces, realistically making its actual capabilities commensurate with probable missions and being guided by the following principle in doing so: in peacetime, the Navy is structured and develops in accordance with planned missions and also performs combat duty; in wartime, it carries out only those missions which correspond to its combat capabilities.

In our view, the Navy's main missions today may be:

- strategic deterrence of a potential aggressor by its capability to immediately put a stop to aggression by destroying the aggressor's key military installations on shore and deep in his territory and inflicting on him unacceptable damage by operations of maritime strategic nuclear forces;
- ensuring the combat stability of its maritime strategic nuclear forces;
- defeating enemy naval groupings in seas adjacent to Russia's coastline and in certain other strategically important areas of oceans;
- assisting troops operating on maritime axes;
- impeding enemy military and economic shipments on the seas and oceans;

—defending friendly basing areas and lines of communication and protecting shipping, fishing, and production activities on the seas and oceans.

The reality of accomplishing these missions may be ensured by unity of political, economic, and military efforts in the organizational development, maintenance, and employment of naval forces both in peacetime and wartime. The inability to assess one's own capabilities and to manage the forces was the primary cause of our defeats at sea during the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time, the Navy does not operate on the seas and oceans on its own. It assists other branches of service, being their forward operational-strategic echelon brought beyond the state borders. With the elimination of the Joint Armed Forces and the departure of Russian groupings of the armed forces from Eastern Europe, the importance and role of the Navy are growing. In essence, its strategic status is changing so fundamentally for the first time since World War II. This is another most important conclusion for understanding the Navy's role in Russia's national security system.

An analysis of the current alignment of forces on the international arena, the increasing penetration of states' national interests into the areas of the world's oceans, and the enormous vital interdependence of peoples and countries give reason to assert that the importance of the struggle at sea will continue to grow. However, accomplishing tasks of armed warfare at sea by even super-powerful navies alone is becoming unrealistic. This is well understood in many countries. In the United States, for example, the Pentagon, believing that the whole world is its area of defense, is gradually shifting a certain part of military missions into space with a simultaneous intensive development of weapons on new physical principles. One must assume that as these new weapons are created, considerable changes will take place both in the means and methods of conducting armed warfare, including at sea. Nuclear weapons will become ineffective and, therefore, unneeded.

In our view, the time has come to search for nontraditional, leading ways of developing the domestic navy, taking into account the peculiarities of the geographic position of Russia's maritime theaters and those missions which the Navy really must and can carry out in the interests of national security. The approach of determining the priority of quality over quantity is nontraditional for us. In the North and the Far East, in our opinion, it is advisable to give priority in development of the Navy to submarines: deep-water, fast, quiet, and multiple-shot with general-purpose weapons. In the future they should become the primary platform for antisatellite and anti-space weapons. In the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas, preference should

probably be given to light ship forces with good missile-artillery and anti-mine armament.

Undoubtedly, ship- and shore-based naval aviation, space-based weapons for the Navy, and shore-based troops will find ways of development for the new conditions and missions. It is quite likely that in the not-too-distant future improvement of weapons and the world trend of development of naval forces will result in the Navy occupying one of the leading places in the armed forces...as a branch capable not only of opposing a threat from the depth of the ocean, but also of defending the country against strikes from space.

Our planet is an oceanic planet. The future of mankind and its universal security depend on the ocean. We do not have the right not to think about this today. **If Russia desires a revival as a world power—it must preserve, strengthen, and develop its Navy.**

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CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Report From WGF Armor Elimination Facility

93UM0830A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
20 Aug 93 p 7

[Report by Sergey Ovsienko: "A Shell Cannot Take out the Armor, But Shears Can Cut it up"]

Report From an Armor Elimination Base

[Text] It was an amazing sight: hydraulic shears, as though in the hands of a giant: the heavy hull of an armored vehicle rotating 1 meter above ground. It was then lowered, and the vehicle's frontal armor was severed.

"And this is 15 millimeters thick," Maj Gen Vladimir Fesenko, armor service chief for the Western Group of Forces, commented.

He is in charge of the WGF's armor elimination base set up in conformity with the Agreement on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Since then the base has eliminated 1,380 out of 2,389 pieces of armored equipment. This is just for the Western Group of Forces. Armored equipment located in Russia is not included. It is covered in a special article in the agreement.

At the same time, Germany is required by the agreement to cut the number of its armored personnel carriers by two thirds: its tanks, by 42 percent. It also covers armored equipment acquired by the FRG from the former army of the GDR. According to some reports the Bundeswehr has almost 250 infantry combat vehicles, around 1,000 T-72 tanks (which have

earned a very good reputation), 260 planes and 80 helicopters of Soviet origin. The Germans are selling the old equipment mainly to third-world nations.

The equipment elimination is governed by major conditions stemming from the agreement. The process is monitored by an international commission made up of representatives of the 11 states which signed the agreement.

"This is the procedure," Maj Gen V. Fesenko explained. "We submit a BMP [infantry combat vehicle] or BTR [armored personnel carrier] to the inspectors along with all the numbers of the hull, the gun, the engine, the chassis.... All of this information is then entered in a special registry and sent to the international elimination center. And we set about dismantling the equipment, the gun and the running gear of all the vehicle's innards. We have at the base a special list of assemblies and parts to be sent to Russia. That which is of little use is turned over for scrapping.

The hydraulic pincers are the final stage in the elimination of armored equipment. Before a BMP comes here, it undergoes dismantling in a giant, 9,000-square-meter building. Rid of its internal rigging, fuels and lubricants, the BMP frame is sent to be washed and then, "ecologically clean," it is sent to the hydraulic pincers. The latter exert a pressure of 1,250 kilograms per square centimeter. A team of 46 people readies six BMPs and eight BTRs for elimination in an 8-hour shift.

This is the entire, simple technology for eliminating Russia's armored equipment. One could think with regret for a long time about how the work of many people incorporated in the BMP or BTR meets an "inglorious" end at the elimination base. But is this necessary? Is it not more expensive for Russia's military department and the nation itself to operate such a large quantity of equipment past the age of 15-20 years? This is just as obvious as the fact that the agreement was signed and should be observed.

In my opinion, the important factor here is to obtain economic gain even in this undertaking. According to Gen Fesenko, the value of the scrap fluctuates between 15 and 50 marks. The WGF has earned around 750,000 German marks from 10,000 tons of the scrap.

It should be said that the scrap is sold at a fairly low price. The base could get more by handling the entire matter itself. It weighed all of the pros and cons, however, and decided to sign a contract with German companies. There was a reason for this. The delivery of oxygen and propane from Russia to cut up the tank hulls would cost the budget considerably. And where would it get equipment capable of dismembering a BMP hull in a matter of minutes. The hydraulic

pincers are American-made and mounted on the chassis of a Japanese tracked excavator....

Russia is carefully observing the terms of the Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which has made a considerable contribution to security on the continent. The Western Group of Forces will complete its share of the elimination of armored equipment by May of 1994.

Pay Raise for Civilian Defense Workers

93UM0826C Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Col Vadim Artamonov, deputy chief of the Directorate of Labor and Wages for Civilian Personnel of the Armed Forces: "Wages for Blue- and White-Collar Workers Are Being Increased"]

[Text] On 4 September 1993 the Russian Federation's minister of defense issued Law No. 424 "On Raising the Minimum Wage and the Monthly Rate (Scale), First Category (Standard Wage Schedule for Civilian Personnel in the Russian Federation's Armed Forces)."

A minimum wage of 7,740 rubles per month is established for military units, establishments, military educational institutions, enterprises and organizations of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense by an order based on the law of the Russian Federation passed on 14 July 1993 indexing the minimum wage and on Decree No. 870 issued by the Council of Ministers and the government of the Russian Federation on 30 August of this year.

Self-financing enterprises and establishments will adopt this pay rate during the third quarter of this year as they come up with their own funds for this purpose.

For civilian personnel of the armed forces whose wages are paid in accordance with Order No. 130 issued by the minister of defense of the Russian Federation in 1993, the monthly rate (scale) for the first category in the Standard Wage Schedule is set in the amount of 8,000 rubles as of 1 September.

Wage benefits and allowances specified for civilian personnel of the armed forces continue in effect.

A telegram regarding the recalculation of pay from 1 September and signed by the minister of defense has been distributed to the forces.

Functions of Finance Service Described

93UM0833B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Yu. Gladkevich, incorporating comments by the Chief of the Military Budget and Finance Directorate of the RF Ministry of Defense, Col-Gen

Vasiliy Vorobyev: "In Defense of State Resources: The Military-Finance Service Turns 75"]

[Text] Today, perhaps, the work of the finance service is watched with particular interest. Unfortunately it has turned out that without having had the time to be fully developed and acquire final form, the Armed Forces of Russia have run into serious financial difficulties. The shortage of funds is felt in practically everything—in supplying the troops with weapons and military equipment and in the social sphere.

Says the Chief of the Main Directorate of the Military Budget and Finance of the RF Ministry of Defense, Col-Gen Vasiliy Vorobyev, "All of this is a consequence of the grave situation in which the country has found itself. The financial status of the Armed Forces remains extremely difficult. Due to the lack of the necessary appropriations, the pay of service members and the wages of civilian personnel are not being paid on time everywhere, and deliveries of food, fuel and other goods to army units and naval units are interrupted. Often the Armed Forces does not receive the minimum funds necessary for their functioning. However, even under these conditions, we are trying to do everything possible so that the army and navy can accomplish their missions.

"The majority of our proposals to strengthen the social protection of service members and their families, civilian personnel, and military retirees meet with the understanding and support of the President of Russia, the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Russian Federation. In the area of pay of service members, measurements comparable with reform are being implemented. For all service members, salaries based on military rank have been introduced, and most types of incentive pay have been established at relative values which make them more flexible under conditions of inflation. The structure of payments of percentage increments for time in service has been changed, and the amounts have been raised. It is now paid to all who serve by contract. The one-time lump award for quality performance of service duties has been raised, and payment of sums for material assistance when service members are on leave has been introduced. A number of questions have been resolved having to do with incentives to perform military service in remote regions, poor climates and 'hot spots.'

"For the first time, payment has been introduced for travel of service members' families to remote locales, and other transportation benefits have been expanded. Important decisions have been made with regard to wages of civilian personnel and pensions for veterans of the Armed Forces. Many ideas are still in the developmental stage, and have not been implemented only because it is very hard to find sources of financing."

The words of the director of the financial service of the military department, it seems to me, are no revelation. Col-Gen Vasilii Vorobyev often visits the line units and always speaks his mind about the problems which must be resolved by the military finance specialists. And it should be noted that the confidence of the troops in this service, its rating in the units, (so to speak), has grown considerably. This is not only because the finance service of the army and navy, and the Main Directorate of the Military Budget and Finance of the RF Ministry of Defense often are the initiators of many measures to improve the logistical support of service members, but also because in these hard times for the army, the military finance specialists monitor the rational expenditure of the small troop treasury with great responsibility, so that funds go first of all for the most urgent needs of the army and navy. Now, for the first time in the history of the military finance service, it is participating most actively in economic analysis of the formation of the Armed Forces, in the forecasting of economic consequences of particular measures, and in adoption of nation-wide solutions that affect the interests of the army and navy.

Having begun in September 1918, the history of the Finance Service of our Armed Forces is now numbering 75 years. Both in the days of peacetime military routine and in the chaotic war years, military finance specialists have demonstrated high professionalism and soldierly courage. For rescuing state monies in the first months of the Great Patriotic War, more than 200 finance officers received orders and medals; and in 1944-1945, almost 18 thousand military finance specialists received awards. Military finance specialists D. Vorobyev, A. Yegorov, V. Zaytsev, A. Kraynov, M. Samarin, G. Sklyar became Heroes of the Soviet Union, while F. Krasnyuchenko was a full-fledged recipient of the Order of Glory.

While they have inherited the experience of their predecessors, the current generation of specialists of the military finance service also solve fundamentally new problems which have arisen due to the formation of the Armed Forces of Russia, and to the development of market relations in the country. The most careful calculations and corresponding financing are required for: the withdrawal of the troops from the far and near frontiers, their accommodation and housing support; the reorganization and structural *perestroyka* of the troops and organs of military command and control; conversion and improvement in weapons; the peace-keeping mission of Russian troops and the transition to a contract system of manpower acquisition; the increasingly more difficult ties of the Armed Forces with the sectors of the domestic economy in the area of rates, prices, contract-making and compliance. These are just a few of the tasks which have been placed on the shoulders of military finance specialists in recent years.

It goes without saying that the Russian army will emerge from these trials with honor; such is the tradition, such is the mood in the units. And it seems to me that an important, if not definitive, role in this is being played by specialists of the financial organs—the preservers and the diligent administrators of the troop treasury of the Armed Forces of Russia.

Status of Winter Provisions for Northern Garrisons

93UM0833A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Sep 93 p 2

[Interview with First Rank Captain Petr Miloserdniy by P. Altunin: "The Great Land—the Far North": "Navigation Is Ending: With What Will the Troops Spend the Winter?"]

[Text] Television and the press are sounding the alarm: Only days remain before the end of navigation, but the delivery of materiel required for wintering in the regions of the Arctic and Far North is under threat of interruption. Certain articles have even suggested the following: "Shouldn't we evacuate the people out of there?" So how are things with regard to supplies for the military garrisons located in those regions? We went with this question to the chief of the Department of Naval and River Transport TsUN of Military Transport Communications [VOSO] Captain First Rank Petr Miloserdniy.

[Miloserdniy] Things are alarming for us now too. You know, we have military units deployed in more than 300 points in the North, Siberia and the Far East. Based on the conditions of their geographic situation, cargoes are delivered to them mainly by naval and river transport.

What is the picture today? There is little joy. It is necessary to transport 195 thousand tonnes of materiel, including 144 thousand tonnes of petroleum products, just to 45 hard-to-reach points. At the start of navigation, all the cargoes that were ready in port, amounting to around 50 percent of the total amount, were transported. Then things slowed down. Because of the lack of money, the supply organs were unable to transport what had been planned to the ports of Archangel, Vladivostok, and Osetrovo, mainly fuel and food. What is happening now? The order has gone out to make up these cargoes at the expense of the stored reserves, and to replenish the latter when the financing is arranged. The process has started afresh, as they say, but it is quite late.

As of September 1, 140.7 thousand tonnes of cargoes (72%) had been sent, including 115.4 tonnes of petroleum products (80%).

[Altunin] So everything is going better now?

[Miloserdniy] I wish it were so. The constant disorganization in planning the shipments is really hurting. We understand that personnel measures are under way, but we must get data on possible shipments quickly. And that is just what we are not getting.

The most glitches are in the PVO [Air Defense Troops]. Their requests are often changed or come in late. The cargoes are also late; sometimes they arrive on the day of dispatch. During the loading of a steamer at Archangel, the shipper suddenly decided to load not 990 tonnes of POL [petroleum oil lubricant] products, as was provided for by the plan, but only 586. The rest, he said, would go when we know whether or not the units are being disbanded. It was no longer possible to involve other shippers in the roadstead mission, so the steamer departed under-loaded. Incidentally, the lease on a steamer like that now costs 2.5 million rubles per day.

Here is another incident. In May, in accordance with the request of the supply organs of the DVO [Far-East Military District], a steamer went to the port of Syurkum (northern coastal region) to pick up 17 units of equipment. But by that point not a single unit had been removed from its position, and none was ready for loading.

We know that the regions of the Far North are regularly inspected by the staffs of the services and arms, officials of the rear services, and the GlavKEU [Main Quarters and Utilities Directorate]. And they are finding a real need for material. But apparently their calculations are not distinguished by accuracy. In August, a ship was sent with 648 tonnes of POL products in containers for one line unit, but the unit commander flatly refused to accept the fuel, saying that he had no place to put it and that he had not submitted any such request. The fuel was accepted only after intervention by the Commander of the Air Defense Troops. The approximate cost of the excessive down time of the ship was around 4 million rubles.

The same thing occurred in one of the port facilities on the southern coast: the unit commander did not want to unload the 40 tonnes of rough lumber that had been delivered to him. It turns out that it had been sent by mistake.

All of these cases provoke fair criticism from the management of the shipping lines, which despite the shortage of tonnage and the absence of reinforcements, are still supporting military shipments. This is probably due to years of inertia and respect for the army.

[Altunin] Is military aviation being used to deliver cargoes to the North?

[Miloserdniy] Not a large percentage. The flyers work conscientiously, and we are grateful. But mix-ups occur here, especially when we have to deal with certain CIS countries. For instance, the Main Directorate of Trade of the Ministry of Defense planned the shipment of early fruits and vegetables to northern regions. Military transport aircraft arrived to pick up the cargo in the states of Central Asia, and there they were told that there were no agreements and no payment.

Incidentally, following such incidents, on July 26 of this year, directive No D-71 of the RF Ministry of Defense "On Organization of Air Delivery of Early Fruits and Vegetables to Garrisons of the Far North, Far East, Transbaykal, and Siberia" went out, demanding that the obstacles be immediately eliminated. In July, 300 tonnes of vegetables and fruits had already been sent to the North. The problem has not been fully resolved, however.

[Altunin] When military units are disbanded, is it necessary to take everything away?

[Miloserdniy] That is a fair question. The answer is absolutely not. You see, the cost of transport often exceeds the cost of the cargo. If we proceed reasonably and study the situation, then some of the cargoes, particular food and KECh [quarters and utility property] may be transferred to the remaining units in accordance with the appropriate documents, and also to border troops. Some things, including clothing and tents, may be sold to geologists, meteorologists etc.

Taking into account the complex navigational and hydro-meteorological situation in certain regions, (where in this season ships will probably not get through), where units are being disbanded, we must already provide for the evacuation of people by helicopter and leave equipment and materiel with the necessary guard until navigation next year.

[Altunin] What priority measures are being taken today to eliminate the deficiencies?

[Miloserdniy] We believe the main thing now is speedy financing of this enormous work, which is constrained by the seasons. Incidentally, one problem is that money goes to the districts and fleets "in a heap," not broken down by expenditure items. Naturally, everyone has a great need for it, and the allocation of sums for transport of cargo is often by the "left-over" principle. And this is the source of all the trouble.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Migration of Russian Servicemen out of Kazakh Armed Forces

93UM0836A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Sep 93 p 2

[Interview with Col. Sabit Taulanov, chief of the personnel directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan, by Anatoliy Ladin under "In the National Armies of the CIS" rubric: "Migrants with Shoulder Straps"]

[Text]

[Ladin] Sabit Saumenovich, in recent months in the KPP [expansion uncertain; possibly "border control point"] of the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan, there has not been the kind of fuss and agitation that could be observed, say, in the summer of last year, when there was a steady flow of people coming and going. So can it be said that the migration of servicemen to Kazakhstan and back has ceased?

[Taulanov] We do not yet think that this problem is "closed" for good. But you correctly observed that the very process of the movement of cadres of officers and warrant officers not related to service necessity has decreased. Basically, those who wanted to leave have already realized their wish. We did not restrain them. For our part, and I can say this with certainty, the agreement signed by the ministries of defense of Kazakhstan and Russia on the arrangements for the performance of military service by officers and warrant officers are being fulfilled consistently.

[Ladin] But it happens, when some servicemen appeal to the press center with complaints against their commanders, who, in their words, are delaying their departure to a new place of service in Russia....

[Taulanov] I know about this. But all of these complaints do not by any means indicate that the agreement that I just mentioned is being violated. Those servicemen who are obliged to account for the military property, weapons, and combat equipment do not leave their units immediately. In some cases, we simply have no one to replace a discharged officer—say, a battalion commander or officer of a regimental or division echelon. In such cases, we ask him to wait a month or two until we find a replacement.

[Ladin] What, in your view, prompts officers who came from Russia to raise the question of transfer out of Kazakhstan? Is it possible that they experience some persecution here?

[Taulanov] There are no delimitations at all in the army of Kazakhstan with respect to nationality, nor will there be any. Our army is just as multinational as the republic itself is.

Ask any officer leaving our republic whether it is easy for him to change his place of service. I am certain that the existing circumstances are forcing very many to make the decision to leave. If it were not for these circumstances, the officers could serve for a long time and some, possibly, would remain in Kazakhstan even after being discharged to the reserves.

[Ladin] What are these circumstances?

[Taulanov] The wave of migration of servicemen was accelerated by the dates named in the Law "On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service" passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and in the decree of the Russian Parliament on the procedures for putting this law into effect. As you know, the law itself states that a citizen of the Russian Federation who performs military service in the military formations of other states (former republics of the USSR) retains the legal status of a serviceman as foreseen by the law of the Russian Federation only at the end of a transition period. But the named decree made the transition period until 31 December 1994. Naturally the people became agitated and hurried to clarify their situation and find a new place of service in Russia.

I believe that a mass outflow of officers is by no means in the interests of Russia or of the Kazakh Army, where a large share of command and special positions are still held by persons coming from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other republics of the former Soviet Union. It is good that the Parliament of the Russian Federation, taking into account our wishes and the mutual interests of Russia and Kazakhstan, finally put off this date for the "determination" of the place of further service of officers until 31 December 1999. The situation in the officer collectives has stabilized to some degree. But still, a deadline has been named. And it is still causing servicemen, especially junior officers, to think about it constantly. That also applies to the Kazakhs in the Russian Army. Many will be forced to leave for home from there.

And now let me say with all sincerity: the overwhelming majority of our citizens in Kazakhstan, whether they be urban or rural dwellers or servicemen, do not want to separate themselves from Russia and are not in favor of military tasks being resolved by our states separately. We are strong only when we are together—that is how our people think. I think that close cooperation with Kazakhstan is also important for Russia. By the way, the treaty on collective security, in which our states are participating, is aimed at this.

Then why, it is asked, should we artificially continue to "nourish" the process of migration of officers? I see it this way: if the Russian Army needs officers from Kazakhstan on account of service requirements, then let them continue to serve there. And Russian officers, if they so desire, would continue to serve in our army without any deadlines and other infringements.

I would like to remind you that we are not forcing officers and warrant officers to take Kazakh citizenship or a new oath. This is clearly stated in the constitution of our state.

New documents are now being prepared that expand the sphere of military cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia. I will say frankly that the units of our army are awaiting their signing with hope.

NGF on Source of Attacks on Russian Garrisons

*93UM0847B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Sep 93 p 3*

[Article by SEGV [Northern Group of Forces] Press Center Associate Igor Golin: "Who is Directing the Zames Sargi? Attacks Against Russian Military Personnel Continue in Latvia"]

[Text] Neither the planned arrival of the UN Mission on the Issues of the Withdrawal of Russian Troops in the Baltic countries nor the impending round of Russo-Latvian negotiations have dampened the ardor of the "zealous fighters with the occupiers" from the 12th Riga Battalion of Zames Sargi [(("Zashchitniki zemli") Defenders of the Land] which Major Voldemar Markus commands. These popular, untrained volunteer military force members armed with assault rifles recently broke into the territory of a former military depot of a Baltic Fleet unit and settled in there like the owners. When Unit Commander Captain 3rd Rank Aleksandr Zherbin arrived there to clarify the circumstances, the Zames Sargi immediately placed him under arrest along with his driver and the vehicle. Markus, who arrived soon thereafter, did not deign to explain to the Russian officer. With the exclamation: "You will nevertheless not leave here alive"—he knocked Zherbin to the ground with the butt of his assault rifle and began to kick him on the ground. Then they handcuffed the unconscious officer and transported him to battalion headquarters where they threw him into a cell for arrested persons. A medical examination has shown that, as a result of the beatings, the

captain 3rd rank received a brain concussion, a head injury, and trauma to his body. And several days earlier...

A Baltic Fleet vehicle column consisting of five trucks, a UAZ [Ulyanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant vehicle] and a bus with an armed guard was traveling with a cargo of ammunition along the streets on the outskirts of the city for loading on a Russian ship. Markus' Zames Sargi blockaded the column en route. For a half hour, 24 tons of explosives were totally dependent on the good sense of the popular, untrained volunteer military force members who continually pointed the barrels of their assault rifles toward the guards and threatened them with grenades. Fortunately, a man arrived at the right time and prevented a misfortune. He turned out to be a representative of the Latvian Bureau for Monitoring the Troop Withdrawal, a Mister Eglitis, who arrived with the highway police vehicles.

Seizures of servicemen, motor vehicles and property continue. What is this? "Individual initiative" not to curry favor of the "popular, untrained volunteer military force members"? It is difficult to rid ourselves of the feeling that someone is directing their activities.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Attacks on Russian Facilities in Georgia

*93UM0825A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Sep 93 p 1*

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vitaliy Denisov: "Attacks on Russian Servicemen in Georgia"]

[Text] Three times this past Friday attacks were carried out against Russian servicemen or facilities of the GRVZ [Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus].

During the day, in the community of Vaziani, unknown, armed individuals wearing military uniforms wounded Sr Lt Genrikh Khoduri with a round from a semiautomatic rifle and hijacked a motor vehicle. That evening, in Tbilisi, the official vehicle of Maj Gen Boris Dyukov, deputy commander for emergencies of the GRVZ, was fired upon with an automatic weapon. Fortunately, the driver was not injured. Around 23:00 unknown individuals attempted an attack upon engineer equipment dumps belonging to Russian forces at Sagaredzho. Security forces were forced to return fire. The attackers escaped.

Georgia Accused of Violating Agreement With Abkhazia

93UM0825B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vitaliy Denisov under the rubric "Events and Commentary": "The Troops Are Departing... in No Hurry"]

[Text]

Abkhazia's Supreme Soviet Accuses Georgia of Violating Agreements

Unfortunately, one cannot yet say that the Sochi agreements toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia are being totally fulfilled. The Georgian side had not completed the withdrawal of armored equipment and heavy weapons from the territory of Abkhazia by the beginning of September. And although around 12,000 Georgian servicemen and as many as 200 pieces of armored equipment have departed from the autonomous republic's territory, the Abkhazian side considers that conditions continue not to be conducive to the return of legal agencies of power to Sukhumi.

This fact was stressed in a statement disseminated by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Abkhazia on Monday. Among other things, the document states that the Abkhazian side is irreproachably fulfilling all points contained in the agreement reached on 27 July on a cease-fire and a system for monitoring its observance. All armed formations, armored equipment and artillery have been withdrawn to the designated sites. However, the statement says, the Georgian side is not withdrawing its armored equipment and artillery from the area of conflict. The breech mechanisms and sights have not been removed from them, and they are in a state of readiness for employment. The document underscores the fact that it is mainly broken-down armored equipment which is being removed and that motor vehicles and auxiliary equipment are being loaded onto vessels designated for the removal of military equipment. Georgian armed formations have been kept at a number of communities in Abkhazia under the guise of police forces.

Incidentally, some people in Tbilisi are inclined to blame the Russian side for the holdup with the evacuation of equipment by sea, claiming that it has not provided the necessary number of vessels. It is primarily the Georgian leadership which is to blame for the hitches with the withdrawal of equipment and weapons from the area of conflict, however. It has failed to organize the operation properly. This is no doubt precisely what has prompted the trilateral commission for settling the conflict to post armed check points at

the community of Okhurey in order to prevent the uncontrolled movement of combat equipment and weapons.

Incidentally, during the night of 6 September an armed detachment consisting of around 200 backers of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, former president of Georgia, entered Gali from Zugdidi and occupied all of the city's main administrative buildings. Shamil Tskhakaya, state adviser to the office of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia, reported this to a GIA-TASS correspondent.

Grachev-Sarkisyan Meeting Planned

93UM0835B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Sep 93 p 1

[Announcement from the Information and Press Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: "Search for a Way Out of the Crisis"]

[Text] On the threshold of the conference of heads of state of the CIS on 7 September, at the request of the President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a meeting was held between Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Gen. of the Army Pavl Grachev and Vazgen Sarkisyan, state minister for defense affairs of Armenia. This was a practical embodiment of the willingness of the Ministry of Defense of Russia to help settle the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict that was expressed in the course of a meeting that took place the day prior to this between Pavl Grachev and the leader of Azerbaijan Gaydar Aliyev. During the conversation of the military leaders of Russia and Armenia, in which Col. Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, took part, they discussed the situation that has developed in the region and outlined possible ways out of the interethnic crisis.

Western Georgia Seen As Next Hot Spot

93UM0835A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Sep 93 p 2

[Article by Petr Karapetyan under "Military-Political Review" rubric: "Georgia: On the Threshold of War and Peace"]

[Text] It seems that after South Ossetia and Abkhazia, western Georgia is about to become the next "hot spot" in the territory of the republic. Forces (1,300 people, according to the information of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA) loyal to ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia under Col. Loti Kobaliya, chief of his personal guard, "surrounded" Poti, Abasha, Senaki, and Khobi have been in their hands for two weeks now. In Zugdidi, they held a session of the "Gamsakhurdian" Supreme

Soviet, from which they expected (without justification, as it has now turned out, but more about this below) the proclamation of the Mingrelian Republic and the "enthronement" of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in this republic.

In Tbilisi, they are greatly concerned about the situation that has developed in the western part of the republic, and not without reason. Let us begin with what Loti Kobaliy declared: If necessary, we will even go as far as Tbilisi. At the same time, he is asserting that a good third of the army withdrawn from Abkhazia is on his side or dissatisfied with the way that the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was resolved. And, in my view, the most important thing is that for the first time Loti Kobaliya made a declaration of a political nature. Appearing on Georgian television, he reported that 60 percent of parliamentarians are prepared for a national reconciliation but this, Kobaliya stressed, can only be achieved under the following conditions: 25 deputies each from the current and "Gamsakhurdian" supreme soviets must formulate a "Law on Elections," new elections must be held in Georgia, but, prior to this power must be transferred to a coalition government.

It is understandable that official Tbilisi will not accept Kobaliya's conditions. By the way, an independent center for sociological studies in Georgia carried out a survey in the capital of the republic. Here are the results: 18.4 percent of the respondents are for the return of Gamsakhurdia, 71.1 percent are against, and 17.1 percent do not believe in the return of the ex-president. The data, one must agree, is rather eloquent but, nevertheless, one still observes a slight panic in the higher echelons of Georgian authority. As long as the west is under the control of the "Zviadists," there can be no talk of a full settlement of the Abkhazian conflict: There is no certainty that they will not provoke another flare-up of resistance. Again, the withdrawal of equipment from the territory controlled by Kobaliya is made more difficult and this causes very understandable concern and nervousness in Gudauta. And in the final analysis, one must consider that the "Zviadists," having overcome their shock after the well-known tragic events of 1991, became much better organized militarily and politically. Their military successes are obvious, but, as for their political successes.... Two years ago, they prepared to proclaim the Mingrelian Republic headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia but they were not allowed to do so. Today no one is preventing them from doing what they want, but they by-passed such a possibility at the session of their Supreme Soviet in Zugdidi. Why? Apparently it was for the following reason: By proclaiming a Mingrelian Republic and putting Zviad at its head, they would essentially be acknowledging that they had satisfied their ambitions. But what was good two years ago does not suit the "Zviadists" today. They need not only Mingrelia but all of Georgia. They are dreaming of

asserting themselves not only in Zugdidi but also in Tbilisi. The appetites of the "Zviadists" are growing....

What can Tbilisi do to oppose them? Use military force? Hardly. The detachments of the Georgian Army were really beaten up in Abkhazia and one must consider the mood there. True, the forces of "Sakartveloye Mkhedrioni" led by Dzhaba Ioseliani are prepared to take action in the western part of the republic right now if necessary but.... They will be opposed by well-armed and well-trained detachments of "Zviadists." Consequently, you cannot take them with your bare hands. More blood and more destruction? They are already fed up with this in Georgia. One must also consider that the population of Mingrelia will not exactly meet "Mkhedrioni" with open arms and will certainly take the side of the "Zviadists" in the event of an armed conflict.

The situation in the west can be defused only through political methods. There is an understanding of this in Tbilisi but the measures that the authorities have taken can hardly be considered adequate. Yes, Eduard Shevardnadze and other officials have frequently come to the western part of the republic. They are studying the local situation, are conferring with local administrations, and are making numerous statements and appeals, but one sees little good from all of this.

What should be done? The situation, in my view, is such that it suggests...seeking direct contacts with Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Even before, he could not be ignored as a political opponent and this is all the more true today. One of the first persons to understand this was Tengiz Kitovani, ex-minister of defense of Georgia. According to the information of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, he visited Gamsakhurdia in the fall of last year in Grosnyy. What they talked about there is another question but the fact remains: They did meet.

I am firmly convinced that life, let us put it this way, will force not only Tengiz Kitovani to beat a path to Zviad Gamsakhurdia. In the final analysis, one cannot act as though he does not notice a person when forces under his control hold half a country. But there is a nuance here as well....

Loti Kobaliya. It is difficult to shake the feeling that he wants to utilize the existing situation for his own maximum advantage. Look at this: There is every indication that he is changing from a "simple executor" into a person who dictates conditions. In any case, it is precisely with him rather than with Gamsakhurdia that Kitovani prefers to deal at this time. And not just Kitovani. Why? Although unexpectedly for many, it is possible that a new "star" has appeared on the political horizon of Georgia....

The "political soup" of Georgia is well mixed. What is left for the remaining 95 percent of the population of

the republic who find themselves on the verge of poverty and barely make ends meet? Perhaps just one thing: To hope that the common sense of the politicians will outweigh their ambitions.

By the way, the adviser of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia, Shamir Tskhakaya, reported at the session of the Georgian Parliament that on the night of the 6th to the 7th of September a detachment of 200 "Zviadists" came from Zugdidi to Gali and seized all of

the main administrative buildings. On 7 September, a force of 300 "Zviadists", supported by 7 pieces of combat equipment, established themselves in a suburb of the city of Lanchkhuti.

In Gudauti, they assess these facts as an alliance of Georgian authorities with Kobaliya. Aleksandr Kavsadze, Eduard Shevardnadze's personal representative in the "hot spots," refuted this assertion.

ARMS TRADE

Moscow Seeks Arms Sales Opportunity in Korea

93UM0832B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Aug 93 p 2

[Unattributed article under the rubric: "Cooperation": "The Koreans Can Be Interested in Russia's Military Developments: The Only Obstacle to That Are American-Korean Agreements"]

[Text] Military-technical cooperation can be one of the directions of Russian-South Korean cooperation and we are prepared to offer it to Seoul, said Russian Federation Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin, having arrived in the capital of the Republic of South Korea on Saturday for participation in Russia Day at "Expo-93"

In A. Shokhin's words, the issue consists of whether or not the South Korean leadership is prepared to give a positive response to Russia's proposal, this is a question of Seoul making a political decision that is associated with the U.S.'s definite obligations.

Moscow, noted the Russian vice premier, thinks that cooperation with Seoul in the sphere of defensive weaponry, at least with regard to the utilization of the high technologies which Russia has at its disposal, is entirely possible.

The Russian side is ready to discuss this problem and could offer the most modern types of weapons—fighter aircraft and "300" series antiaircraft missile systems that, as Aleksandr Shokhin stressed, enjoy great popularity in the world and are purely defensive in nature.

RIA reports that the program of Aleksandr Shokhin's visit to the Republic of Korea which will last until 25 August provides for his meetings with President Kim Yong Sam and with the ministers of foreign affairs and the economy.

Ukrainian Specialist on Dual-Use Export Controls

93WP0240.1 Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian 28 Aug 93 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Yakovenko, senior scientific associate at the Dnepropetrovsk Branch of Ukraine's National Institute for Strategic Studies, under the rubric "Policy": "Ukraine and COCOM"]

[Text] The establishment of a system for regulating foreign economic relations is among the urgent tasks facing Ukraine as it creates the new economic and political machinery. Monitoring the export of goods and technologies which could be used for military purposes is the most important component of strategic regulation. In accordance with international praxis these include

weapons, military materials, materials and technologies used in nuclear-power engineering, and "dual-use" goods and technologies.

The strategic regulation of Ukraine's exports is complicated by the fact that a significant portion of its technological capacity is concentrated in the military-industrial complex. The export problem is therefore closely linked to the conversion problem.

Just what functions must an export control system perform? First of all, it must provide for the state's military and economic security. The problem of export controls contains an inner conflict: On the one hand, the most vigorous campaign possible must be waged for world markets in science-intensive products; on the other, their exports must be restricted for purposes of protecting preeminence and competitiveness in the world market. World experience has convincingly demonstrated that with skilful organization export controls will not only not hamper Ukraine's economic development but, on the contrary, will help it to extricate itself from its crisis as rapidly as possible.

By joining the international agreement on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, Ukraine opens up new opportunities for developing international economic ties and makes it a predictable partner worthy of respect and trust in the international arena. This policy is leading to the organization of a global system for preventing the proliferation of weapons, while simultaneously providing for the transfer of the latest technologies for peaceful purposes.

There are numerous and various political and economic obstacles on this path. The national systems must continue to have export controls for purposes of preventing the use of exported goods and technologies to the detriment of national and state interests. Export controls are extensively used in the Western nations to protect preeminence and technological advantages in world markets. This purpose is served by COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Control of Strategic Exports), which unites 17 industrially developed nations.

By conducting a policy of openness and trust Ukraine has a right to expect reciprocal action from its new partners and to insist on equality of technological exchange with the West, making the lifting of its own export restrictions dependent upon the liberalization of exports by the COCOM members. Since there is a demand for modern technologies on both sides, the reciprocal lowering of bans and restrictions will help to strengthen trust and economic cooperation among the partners. Export controls have become an important element not just in military policy but also in the economic and political strategy of the Western nations, and they played a role in the victory for the USA and

its allies in the cold war. The export control system is presently becoming a global phenomenon. An effort is underway to draw all nations which export high-tech products into it, the export control machinery has been set up, and a transition is being made from controls over individual items to control over the most important technologies.

The U.S. regards technological security as a component of national security. The U.S. now has a greater role in shaping the strategy and organization of the entire Western system of export controls, which presently unites 17 industrially developed nations.

The ending of the confrontation between the military and political blocs and the relaxation of the arms race are creating the preconditions for more active international cooperation. At the beginning of the 1990's, the Western nations set about liberalizing control over exports in products not crucial to scientific and technological progress. This was motivated, on the one hand, by a desire to promote the integration of the countries of Eastern Europe and CIS into the world market economy and to influence the nature of that integration, and on the other, by a desire to open up new markets for goods. Business circles are also applying considerable pressure to the governments of the Western nations to get them to open up new economic areas for business relations (experts estimate that American companies lose as much as 50 billion dollars in income annually due to export restrictions).

At the end of 1992 COCOM lifted the most offensive restrictions on exports to Russia and other CIS states, which were hampering the development of international cooperation in the economic area. According to assessments in the foreign press, however, COCOM is still engaged in the cold war. Representatives of ATT (USA), Cable and Wireless (Great Britain) and Siemens (FRG) maintain that an "organization set up to say 'no' cannot force itself to say 'yes.'" The NEW YORK TIMES reports that there continues to be a ban on exports to Russia of various computers which would help the Russians convert defense enterprises. COCOM regulations prevented the Sun Microsystems company from selling its personal computers to two Moscow motor-vehicle plants, since, although compact, they have the power of the supercomputer used to create nuclear missiles.

According to the experts, COCOM strategy for the 90's is being implemented in a situation of a well-organized and smoothly functioning system of export controls measuring up to the contemporary stage of the scientific and technological revolution. The most favorable terms will be extended to nations concluding agreements with COCOM or the USA on the observance of rules for multilateral export controls. The most stringent conditions will be set for shipments to third-world

countries with hostile or unfriendly relations with the USA (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Cuba and North Korea). The status of Ukraine and other CIS countries within this system will obviously depend upon the situation in those states.

Within the framework of the strategy worked out by COCOM the Western nations have agreed to liberalize control over exports of those goods which are not crucial to scientific and technological progress. This was motivated by a desire to facilitate the integration of the countries of Eastern Europe and CIS into the world market economy, as well as by an interest in acquiring technological achievements existing in the CIS countries. American experts have compiled a list of more than 3,000 technologies possessed by the CIS states in which the U.S. has either fallen behind or does not possess. Along with the traditional exports, Ukraine, Russia and other CIS states are in a position to become exporters of missile and space, metallurgical and other technologies, and suppliers of science-intensive goods and services to the world market.

According to the foreign press, "Russia has already begun slowly but certainly moving expensive, highly complex technologies into the world market, using three trump cards: achievements in aircraft engineering, the mastery of space and a great intellectual capability in the area of applied mathematics and computer programming."

By joining the Western system of export controls, Ukraine would help to solve a number of urgent problems preventing the nation from extricating itself from its profound economic crisis, to eliminate the critical technological lag behind the developed nations and to strengthen the trust of the U.S., the EC and other nations in Ukraine as a sovereign state. The modernization of Ukraine's economy cannot be based exclusively on imported technology. It must be achieved in great part on the basis of equal partnership. Along with the acquisition of substantial amounts of foreign exchange, the lifting of restrictions imposed upon Ukraine by COCOM would contribute to the development of scientific and technological cooperation with leading scientific organizations and companies, the concentration of personnel and funds in the most important areas of science and technology, those of crucial and fundamental importance for scientific and technological progress, "less painful" conversion of the military-industrial complex, a reduction in the drain of highly skilled specialists abroad and into commercial structures, the creation of new jobs and the restructuring and thorough modernization of the scientific and technological base.

In Ukraine the system of strategic regulation of exports of goods and technologies is still in the formative stage. The first step toward its establishment was the passage

by Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers of a decree outlining measures to ensure proper control over exports (and imports) of weapons, military equipment, individual types of raw and processed materials, equipment and technologies which could be used in the production of weapons, military and special equipment, and to ensure that Ukraine fulfills its international commitments regarding weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.

The Statute on the Government Commission on Export Controls and Its Staff has been approved. It has sole authority to license and set quotas on the sale and purchase of technologies, equipment, dual-use materials, weapons and military equipment, spare parts for them and military supplies.

Ukraine must select and consistently implement a clearly defined policy toward COCOM and a "form of cooperation" which conforms to international agreements and Ukrainian laws. It is important, however, to prevent this system from becoming a means of applying unilateral pressure on Ukraine, to see that it protects the national interests firmly and consistently and promotes to the maximum possible degree the formation of a multilateral system for the exchange of technologies for peaceful purposes based on equal partnership.

The earliest possible development of a state system of export controls will make it possible to regulate the proliferation of Ukrainian goods and technologies abroad in accordance with Ukrainian laws and national interests.

Russian Delegation Visits Phnom Penh

93UM0847A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by ITAR-TASS Correspondent Viktor Kirillov: "There Are No Spare Parts—and the Tanks Have Stopped Operating in Cambodia"]

[Text] A meeting between Cambodian Coalition Government Co-Chairmen Norodom Ranarit and Hun Sen and a delegation of Russian military experts took place in Phnom Penh.

The Russian delegation arrived in Cambodia at the invitation of a local party. The goal of its stay is to study the needs of the country's armed forces for maintaining combat vehicles and military equipment in operating condition that had been supplied at one time by the former Soviet Union. Cambodia is interested in Russia's military-technical assistance because right now it is incapable of purchasing new arms abroad.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Turkey Raises Military Alert Status

93UM0827A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Viktor Kirillov: "Ankara Puts Forces on Higher Alert Status"]

[Text] According to reports from Ankara: Turkey, alarmed at Armenian armed units' advance deep into Azerbaijani territory and by movements of Iranian military units near the borders of that Transcaucasian republic, has reinforced its troops along the border with Armenia. In addition, it has put them on a higher alert status.

Needless to say, the situation in the region was already quite strained. Such actions by the Turkish side undoubtedly play into the hands only of those who want to see a regionalization of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

Discussion Of U.S. MLRS

93UM0827B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Sep 93 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Foreign Army Weapons and Equipment: MLRS 'Sows' Steel Rain"]

[Text] Under the concepts of "air-land battle" and "follow-on forces attacks" adopted by the United States and NATO in the late 1970s and early 1980s, efforts were begun to develop weapons systems necessary to implement these plans. One of these systems, intended for the tactical and operational-tactical units (divisions, corps) was the MLRS multiple rocket launcher. A memorandum on the joint development and mandatory subsequent placement in service of the first standardized MLRS for the NATO countries was signed in December 1974 by the United States, Britain, the FRG, and France. They were joined by Italy in 1982. The contract to develop the system was awarded to the American company LTV Aerospace and Defense. Production got under way in 1982, and the new MLRS began reaching American forces a year later and the armies of the consortium's other countries two to three years later. In organizational terms, the MLRS is deployed in field artillery batteries and battalions. Army divisions and corps have nine and 27 rocket launchers respectively.

The standard MLRS consists of a mobile rocket launcher, rockets in transport-launcher containers, and communications and guidance systems.

The M-270 launcher is mounted on the chassis of the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. In contrast to

other MLRS systems, it does not have guide rails. The rockets are launched directly from reusable containers. Incidentally, the rockets can be stored in the containers for 10 years and remain ready for use. A winch and crane boom mounted directly on the MLRS are used to erect the containers. The cabin that houses the crew members is protected with armor plating. It also contains the "brains" of the system—a computer and other fire control equipment.

The rockets of the MLRS system are unguided and use solid fuel. A salvo by a single MLRS consists of 12 rockets. The rockets have a diameter of 230 mm and are 3,365 mm long. The producer plant packs six rockets in each transport-launcher container.

There are several basic types of rockets for this MLRS. In the first type, a cluster warhead contains 644 M0-77 shaped-charge and fragmentation submunitions that can destroy personnel, motor vehicles and other equipment, and armored targets with armor up to 70 mm thick. The rocket's range is about 30 km, and the effective coverage area of one MLRS is 2.5 hectares.

In the second type, the rocket's warhead can be equipped with TGV antitank submunitions equipped with homing heads during the final part of the flight path. The range of a rocket with these submunitions is up to 40 km; this is attributable to its reduced weight in comparison with the previous type.

The rocket can also be armed with 28 AT-2 antitank mines. A salvo by two rocket launchers can lay an antitank mine-field along a front of 1,000 to 1,500 meters.

The MLRS was actively used during the war in the Persian Gulf. American forces delivered 189 rocket launchers to the Kuwaiti military theater. They launched 9,660 rockets against such targets as artillery positions, air defense positions, concentrations of tanks and motor vehicles, enemy personnel, and helicopters at landing sites. However, the MLRS's greatest effect was psychological. Prisoners testified that Iraqi troops were literally demoralized by the "steel rain" that pelted them from the skies.

It should be pointed out that during those combat operations, the US Army's new ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles (intended to replace the Lance missile) were fired from MLRS rocket launchers for the first time. Three batteries with 27 rocket launchers were specially modernized to fire these missiles. The combat operations showed that the MLRS was the only US field artillery system capable of "working" in tandem with

Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, as well as with tactical frontline aviation, which provided target designation and correction.

Among the MLRS's shortcomings, those who fought in the battles noted the comparatively short range of the rockets, and also the fact that the M-77 submunitions were essentially ineffective against Iraqi armored targets.

SECURITY SERVICES

Inter-Security Service Agreement Reported

93UM0826A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Sep 93 p 1

[Report from the Center for Public Relations of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Security: "One Can Neither Hide From Nor Escape the Chekists"]

[Text] As previously reported, the Ministry of Security has signed agreements on interaction with a number of security services in neighboring foreign countries.

An operation conducted on 3 September of this year by the Administration for Combatting Corruption and Smuggling of the Ministry of Security and involving the leader of a criminal group of Turkmenistan who had long hidden from the investigative agencies in Moscow was a result of this cooperation. The criminal's record includes extortion involving the use of force and the illegal acquisition and possession of drugs, fire arms and ammunition. The arrestee has been turned over to Turkmenistan's law-enforcement agencies.

12th Border Detachment Again Under Fire

93UM0826B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Sep 93 p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Boris Soldatenko: "The 12th Border Detachment Is Once Again Defending"]

[Text] On Sunday militants in the Tajik opposition made two attempts to penetrate the Tajik-Afghan border on the 12th Border Detachment's sector.

At the press bureau of the Russian border troops we were informed that with support from subunits of the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division the border troops attacked with fire, blocked the militants and drove the intruders back to adjacent territory. At the present time, this area is covered by border detachment forces and personnel of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division.

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